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BURDENS WITHIN BURDENS AT A
TRIAL WITHIN A TRIAL
WILLIAM J. BRIDGE .
When evidence is offered and a proper objection is made,' the issues
raised by the objection normally must be resolved before the evidence is ad-
mitted.' The law of evidence requires a determination of the existence of condi-
tions precedent before the admission or exclusion of the proffered evidences A
decision on the existence of these conditions often requires preliminary factual
determinations as well as the application of a legal standard.* For example,
before a proffered witness may testify in the form of an expert opinion, a deci-
sion must be made whether he is sufficiently qualified by training or experience
to give such testimony.' A ruling must also be made if there is a question of the
applicability of the hearsay rule or one of its exceptions.' In practical terms, the
evidence will be admissible only if the proper foundation is established.' This
process of determining facts and applying standards has been called "a trial
within a trial."e
Whenever there is a dispute over preliminary facts governing the ad-
missibility of evidence, an allocation of the burdens of proof is made. Since the
allocation often determines whether the evidence is admitted, it may affect the
outcome of the case. In addition, the allocation decision should foster, rather
than hinder, the policies reflected in the governing rules of evidence. For these
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development of the ideas in this article.
See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW, S 18 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1981). See generally 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE 5 5036 (1977 & Supp. 1981) (objections must be:
specific, timely, and of record).
See FED. R. EvID. 104. Subdivision (a) assigns to the judge the determination of cer-
tain preliminary questions "subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)." Subdivision (b) permits
the judge to admit evidence "subject to the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing of the fulfillment of the condition" upon which relevancy depends.
3 See FED. R. EvID. 104(a), advisory committee note ("The applicability of a par-
ticular rule of evidence often depends upon the existence of a condition. [For example,) [i]s the
alleged expert a qualified physician? . . . [T]he admissibility of the evidence will turn upon the
answer to the question of the existence of the condition."); R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 58 (4th ed.
1974) ("There are conditions precedent which are required to be fulfilled before evidence is ad-
missible for the jury" e.g., oath and competency are conditions precedent to admitting viva voce
evidence.).
See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 53 (2d ed. 1972 &
Supp. 1978).
5 See FED. R. Ewa 702. See generally Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414
(1952) (general discussion of expert testimony).
6 See FED. R. Evil). 801-804.
7 See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 2 (1980) (practical
guide to establishment of foundations for admissibility).
B R. CROSS, supra note 3, at 58.
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reasons, it is important that allocation be a conscious decision and not the mere
result of unquestioned habit.
Unlike several other procedural issues in preliminary fact disputes, 9 the
question of how burdens of proof are to be allocated when preliminary issues of
fact are in dispute has not frequently been discussed. This question has been
obscured for a number of reasons. As the law of evidence developed, the
primary concern was the development of the governing rules themselves, and
relatively little attention was given to their procedural implementation." To
the extent procedure was considered, more obvious procedural issues came
more rapidly into focus." Further, the admission of evidence is an area tradi-
tionally within the broad discretion of the trial judge." Finally, the process,
which normally occurs quickly," is subject to both habit, and to the quality of
advocacy by lawyers prepared to support or oppose the admission of evidence.
9 See, e.g. , F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 1.1, at 2-4 (2d ed. 1977)
(The law of procedure serves as a model of dispute-resolution technique.). It must be decided, for
example, who will make the final decision on admissibility, the judge or the jury. 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 1, S 2550 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). The traditional view is that the judge serves as fact-
finder in the determination of preliminary questions. Supporters of this view have reasoned that
when the judge decides preliminary fact questions, simplicity in procedure, consistency of rul-
ings, protection from prejudice, and precision in reviewability are all facilitated. Maguire & Ep-
stein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392,
393-94 (1927). See also Morgan, Functions ofJudge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions
of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165 (1929).
The traditional view has been adopted by recent codifications of the rules of evidence.
See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (Preliminary questions concerning "the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the [conditional relevancy] provisions of Rule 104(b)."); CAL. EVID. CODE 55
403, 405 (West 1966). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 53; Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs —
An Essay in Honor of David Loasell, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 987 (1978); Laughlin, Preliminary Questions
of Fact: A New Theory, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 286-88 (1974).
Another issue is whether the rules of evidence should apply in determining what
evidence may be considered in making these preliminary determinations. An uneasy consensus
seems to have been reached that they do not. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (determination of
preliminary fact questions not governed by the rules of evidence, except those relating to
privilege). See also 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 5 35, at 266-67 (1980).
See generally, Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36
YALE L.J. 1101, 1101-03 (1927) (discussing prior authorities).
A third question concerns the appropriate standards of persuasion. Despite cogent
criticism, the traditional rule that admissibility, even over a constitutional objection in criminal
cases, is determined by a preponderance of the evidence seems to retain its vitality. See United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 678 & n.5 (1980); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87, 487
n.15 (1972); Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271
(1975).
1 ° Cf. Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility,
36 YALE L.J. 1101, 1103 n.8 (1927).
" See supra note 9.
12 See McElroy, Some Observations Concerning the Discretion Reposed in Trial Judges by the
American Law Institute's Code of Evidence, in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 356, 360-64 (1942); 1 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, 5 16. See generally R. BOWERS, THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL
COURTS (1931); Abbott, The Principles of Evidence, 1 UNIV. L. REV. 25 (1893); 22 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 1, 5 5215.
" See Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36
YALE L.J. 1101, 1125 (1927). But see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
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In jury trials, errors in assigning the risk of non-persuasion on ultimate
issues of fact come to light only because the risk is explicitly assigned in the
court's instruction to the jury." In bench trials, reversals on this ground are
avoided unless the trial judge makes the assignment explicit." In part for the
same reason, the placement of the risk of non-persuasion in preliminary mat-
ters often evades review.' 6 The implicit nature of the process, and the infre-
quency of focused appellate review, have resulted in inadequate consideration
of important questions. Since, however, the allocation of burdens of proof in
determinations of preliminary facts is crucial to the admission or exclusion of
evidence, it is important to examine both how such allocations have been made
in the past, and how a rational system can be developed to make such alloca-
tions in the future.
This article is an analysis of the bases for allocating the burdens of proof in
disputes over the admissibility of evidence. First, An analysis of the burden of
proof as it has developed in the context of substantive law is presented. Then,
there will be a discussion of the evolution of the factors which have been iden-
tified as affecting the assignment of the burden, and an adaptation of those fac-
tors to the procedure for resolving preliminary questions. The article concludes
with an evaluation of allocations made under selected provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in the context of these principles. It will be argued that a
principled basis for allocating burdens of proof on preliminary questions can be
developed from the principles used to explain the allocation of burdens of
substantive law questions. These principles can then be applied to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and a systematic method of making such allocations can be
devised.
I. BURDENS OF PROOF IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Two separate concepts are incorporated in the term burden of proof — the
burden of persuasion and the burden of production." The burden of persua-
sion is relevant only at the time the fact-finder makes his ultimate decision,"
505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980, as amended 1981) pretrial evidentiary rulings); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
" See F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 9, § 7.6 at 243 n.8 (although the judge in
deciding an issue should apply the same guides as would be prescribed for a jury, without a
recorded charge there is no way to ensure this procedure is followed).
" Id.
16 Perhaps, as in nonjury trials, it would bebetter to avoid articulation, and simply to
apply "a common sense test." Cf. F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 9, § 7.6, at 243 n.8. But,
since the allocation affects as well as reflects the law of evidence, it is worthy of analysis. See supra
text and notes at notes 8-9.
17 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW, 355
(1898).
" Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales QM-slice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86
YALE L. J. 1299, 1300 n.3 (1977) (distinction between burden of persuasion and burden of pro-
duction usually attributed to Thayer). See J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 355.
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"when all is said and done. '"° It is a rule of decision holding that, when the
fact-finder remains in doubt about the truth of the disputed proposition after
hearing all admissible evidence, it must decide the fact against the party bear-
ing the burden. 2° The burden of production, on the other hand, is merely the
duty to produce some evidence on an issue," at the risk of an adverse decision
if no such evidence is introduced. 22
 The burden of production is merely a pro-
cedural device that identifies which party must come forward with evidence at
any given time, enabling the judge to decide if there is a sufficient basis for a
jury verdict. 23
The burden of production is not relevant when the judge is the fact-finder,
because there is no reason to ask whether there is sufficient basis for a jury ver-
dict." When there is a single fact-finder, the judge, the issue of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a certain decision is not divorced from the issue of
whether the fact-finder is actually persuaded of the existence of the disputed
matter. In the context of admissibility decisions, the judge, as decider of these
preliminary questions, must be persuaded of the existence of the conditions for
admission, or exclusion, of the proffered evidence." Although the party bear-
ing the burden of persuasion must, of course, produce evidence to meet his
burden, his duty to produce evidence is not really a burden of production, but
rather is incidental to his burden of persuasion." The focus of concern in this
" J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 355.
" Id. See also C. MCCORmicK, supra note 4, 5 336.
21 See Underwood, supra note 18, at 1300 n.3.
22 W. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 5 268 (Phipson ed. 1922),
(citing Amos v. Hughes, 174 Eng. Rep. 160 (1835)). See also F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note
9, 5 7.7, at 245; J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 355.
23 Ste 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, 5 2487 at 293 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). Wigmore
built on Thayer's foundation. He identified the burden of production as the duty to produce
evidence to the judge. Id.
The burden of production is a function of judicial control over the jury, that is, that a
party must produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor. See Cleary,
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay in Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5, 15-16 (1959). Since the
judge decides whether the burden of producing evidence has been satisfied, he has effective con-
trol over the jury. Id. at 16. See also F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 9, 5 7.7, at 246 (in
allocating burden of production, judge controls jury by pre-screening the case); J. MAGUIRE,
EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 175-76 (1947).
24 See McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68
HARV. L. REv. 1382, 1385 (1955). Since the party with the burden of persuasion will lose if the
factfinder is in doubt at the moment of decision, he usually must start the process of persuasion.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, S 337. In some cases, the burdens of persuasion and produc-
tion are allocated separately. Affirmative defenses in criminal cases are often interpreted to mean
that, while the defendant has a burden of production, the prosecution retains the burden of per-
suasion. See J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 382-83, & 383 n.2, (citing Davis v. United States, 160
U.S. 469 (1895) (insanity defense)). Professor Cleary noted that presumptions are devices to alter
the burden of production, and sometimes to assign it differently from the burden of persuasion.
See Cleary, supra note 23, at 16.
25 In some instances questions of preliminary fact are expressly committed to the jury.
See FED. R. Evm. 104(b), 602, 901 (a), 1008.
26 See Stone, Burdens of Proof and the Judicial Process, 60 L.Q. REV. 262, 265 (1944). See
also F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 9, S 7.7, at 249 ("concept of a production burden will be
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article, therefore, is the risk of non-persuasion of the existence of conditions
precedent to evidentiary rulings.
II. BASES FOR BURDEN ALLOCATION IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The guiding principles for allocating the burden of proof in the sense of
deciding which party bears the risk of non-persuasion on ultimate issues of fact
have been articulated in varying ways." Wigmore's conclusion was that alloca-
tion of burdens on substantive questions was "merely a question of policy and
fairness based on experience in the different situations." 28 Morgan and Mc-
Cormick brought their formidable talents to bear on the issue of allocation
without much more precision. 29 Morgan did indicate that in allocating the
burden of persuasion, courts should be guided by reasons of substance and
policy and that "no mere dogma should be given the slightest consideration, no
matter how high its source or how often it has been repeated."" Each also
alluded to precedent. Morgan indicated that "prior judicial experience, as
fully applicable in cases tried to a judge without a jury," since the tribunal has no responsibility
to acquire the materials for decision).
27 Thayer correctly considered the question primarily one of substantive law, and
perhaps also one of the law of procedure generally, rather than one of evidence. J. THAYER, supra
note 17, at 388-89. Since the allocation of the burden of persuasion will determine which party
prevails when the decisionmaker is in doubt, the allocation is as substantive a decision as the
recognition of a right to recovery in the first place. See supra text and notes at notes 18-22. When
the burden of production is assigned to a party, that assignment makes recovery more difficult,
and therefore should reflect the substantive preference for one result over another. See Under-
wood, supra note 18. Thayer made an eloquent, but hitherto unrequited plea that the law of
evidence be relieved of the burden of the topic of the burden of proof. J. THAYER, supra note 17,
at 389. See also Cleary, supra note 23, at 10. While Thayer's position is correct on burdens of
substantive issues, it cannot be doubted that the law of evidence must address the issue of
burdens of proof in preliminary matters. It is the law of evidence which establishes the preference
for or against admission of the proffered evidence.
" 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, S 2486, at 291 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). The allocation of
burdens should have a principled basis, whether the assignment is explicitly made by the
legislature, or by the court. When the court makes the allocation, the express or implied
legislative preference itself becomes one of the bases for decision. When the legislature makes the
assignment, it should consciously do so, considering the reasons for it. See infra text and notes at
notes 33-59.
29 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, S 337; E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, Chapter Two U. Weinstein 5th ed. 1976).
S' E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF LITIGATION 70-71 (1956). Both Morgan and McCormick dismissed the argument that the
burden of proof should follow the burden of pleading. Morgan found correlating the burden of
persuasion with the burden of pleading helpful only where available precedents established the
pleading rule. Id. at 75. In addition, since modern pleadings often end with the answer, Morgan
found this linkage of the burden of persuasion with the burden of pleading unrealistic since many
issues are not revealed by the pleading. Id. McCormick agreed that tying the burden of proof to
the burden of pleading was unsatisfactory. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 337, at 785-86.
Bases for the allocation of the burden of pleading were stated classically by Judge Charles Clark
in his text on pleading. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 5 96, at 608 -09
(2d ed. 1947). Clark indicated that assignment of the responsibility for pleading is based upon
policy, convenience and fairness. Id.
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revealed in past decisions, has strong persuasive effect."" McCormick, in con-
trast, had less respect for precedent, saying that assignment of burdens is partly
the result of "merely traditional happen-so.""
The most influential analysis of the reasons influencing the allocation of
the burden of persuasion is Professor Edward Cleary's "Presuming and
Pleading, An Essay on Juristic Immaturity. "" Cleary criticized the approach
of courts that assign the burdens of proof on the basis of the statutes creating
the right of action, on the ground that they were frequently phrased without
concern for their procedural consequences." He rejected this "purely
mechanical approach" as too "accidental," since legislators frequently do not
intend to allocate the burden of proof by their choice of language. 35 Next, Pro-
fessor Cleary rejected reliance on precedent, since "precedent as such does
nothing for the inquiring mind. "" Cleary also rejected two other analytical
cliches of burden allocation." That a party asserting the affirmative of a prop-
osition bears the burden of demonstrating it is a time-honored and time-worn
principle of debate." Since either the affirmative or the negative of any prop-
osition can be affirmatively asserted, any student of logic or language can easily
mock this principle." Even more easily refuted is the cliche that the burden
rests upon the party to whom the proposition is essential, since that resolution,
in McCormick's phrase, simply "restates the question.""
After clearing the land, Cleary sowed the principles which subsequent
commentators have reaped." When a governing statute makes an allocation of
3 ' E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 21 (J. Weinstein
5th ed. 1976).
32 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 318, at 674 (1954). See
also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 337, at 786 (" [Assignments of burdens) owe their develop-
ment partly to traditional happen-so and partly to considerations of policy.").
" CLEARY, supra note 23.
3+ Id. at 8-9. Cleary illustrated this point by contrasting the procedural effects of a
Massachusetts statute with a Kentucky statute. Both statutes made a dog owner liable for all in-
juries caused by his dog and prohibited recovery only if the person had been injured under
designated circumstances while engaged in unlawful activity. Judicial interpretation of the
Massachusetts statute resulted in a two-year-old child plaintiff being assigned the burden of prov-
ing that he had not been tormenting the dog. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky held that the Kentucky statute allocated to the plaintiff the mere burden of showing that he
had been bitten by the defendant's dog; thus the burden of proof of plaintiff's nighttime presence
or illegal daytime activity on the dog owner's land was on the defense. Id. at 8-9.
" Id. at 8.
36 Id. at 10.
32 Id. at 11.
38 Set W. WILHOFT, MODERN DEBATE PRACTICE 128-29 (1931).
89 Id. The rule requiring a party who pleads the affirmative on a particular fact issue to
bear the burden of proving that proposition has been severely criticized. The rule implicitly
allows a party to control the allocation of the burden of proof by framing his averment in the
negative. See F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 9, 5 7.8, at 249-50; C. MCCORMICK, supra note
4, 5 337, at 786 (rule unduly emphasizes what is essentially a matter of form); Cleary, supra note
23, at 11 (rule is mere play on words).
4° C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 337, at 786. See Cleary, supra note 23, at 11.
41 See, e.g., Grumman Aerospace Corp. v, United States, 579 F.2d 586, 594 n.16 (Ct.
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the burdens of proof, of course it must be obeyed." Many statutes, however,
do not explicitly allocate burdens; when they do not, the courts must make the
allocation." In making this decision, the courts should have guidelines. The
guidelines urged by Cleary are policy, fairness and probability."
Cleary characterized this trio of considerations as containing "some real
meaning," "despite the vagueness of their generality."" The policy con-
sideration requires allocating burdens in such a way as to favor "one or the
other party to a particular kind of litigation, thus discouraging the making of a
disfavored claim."" The approach of the courts to the obsolescent question of
contributory negligence is illustrative. Proof of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence can be an affirmative defense or proof of its absence can be an ele-
ment of the plaintiff's case in chief. The latter assignment disadvantages the
plaintiff, while the former weights the scales against the defendant. Thus, the
court affects relief by allocating the burden of proof,'" Fairness, Cleary's sec-
ond consideration, is illustrated by the notion that when evidence of a proposi-
tion is more within the control of one of the parties, that party should have the
burden of presenting it. 4° For example, in an action for debt, a defense of pay-
ment is normally characterized as affirmative," which means that the defend-
ant bears the burden." One justification for that allocation is that if payment
had been made, the person who made it is more likely to have access to
evidence which will prove it," Finally, probability is a factor governed by a
judicial ("i.e. wholly nonstatistical") 52 estimate of probable factual cir-
cumstances, with the consequential placing of the burden on the party urging
that the instant facts depart from the probable circumstances. 53
Cleary illustrated the process of judicial probability analysis with several
Cl. 1978); Nelson v. Hughes, 290 Or. 653, 625 P.2d 643, 645-46 & 646 n.5 (1981); 1 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 300[02] n.4 (1981); Degnan, The Law of Federal
Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REv. 275, 299 & n.103 (1962); Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and
Burden of Proof, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1151, 1172 (1972); Epstein, Pleading and Presumptions, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 556, 572-82 (1973); Shuman, The Road to Bedlam: Evidentiary Guideposts in Civil Com-
mitment Proceedings, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 53, 68 (1979).
42 See Cleary, supra note 23, at 8.
" Id. at 10.
" Id. at 11.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 65, at 416-17 (4th ed. 1971).
46 Cleary, supra note 23, at 12.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
5° See C. McCORmiCK, supra note 4, 5 337, at 786-87; id. 5 346, at 830-31.
u See Cleary, supra note 23, at 12. The authors of McCormick's second edition note
that greater pretrial discovery weakens the importance of this consideration. See C. MCCOR•
MICK, supra note 4, 5 337, at 787 n.19.
52 Cleary, supra note 23, at 12.
53 Id. at 12-13. McCormick illustrated this consideration with the example that, in a
business relationship, it is unlikely that a service will be performed for free, therefore the burden
of proving a gift in that context is placed upon the party asserting it. On the other hand in a fami-
ly situation, a gratuitous service is considered more likely, and the burden of proving the right to
compensation is upon the party claiming it. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 337, at 787.
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examples. Guest statutes prohibit recovery for mere negligence of the driver by
a non-paying passenger." If most automobile passengers are non-paying, then
the passenger-plaintiff should bear the burden of showing compensation. If
most pay, then showing plaintiff's non-payment should be required of the de-
fendant as an affirmative defense." In effect, the burden of proof should be
allocated to the party asserting that the instant facts differ from the norm.
Cleary urged that the same analysis be applied to allocations of the burden of
proof when the events a party seeks to establish have occurred after a plaintiff's
rights have accrued. 56
 Examples of such events are the payment or release of a
debt, or the running of the statute of limitations. These are usually affirmative
defenses, on which the burden of proof has been placed on the defendant. This
assignment, in the case of later events, Cleary argued, was based on the
assumption "that a condition once established is likely to continue. "57 Conse-
quently, the burden should fall on the party asserting that the condition has
changed. 58
 Cleary argued that such an appropriate use of probability would
work the least injustice, since it effectively creates a presumption that the most
likely factual circumstances did in fact occur."
Professor Cleary advanced these three principles, policy, fairness and
probability, as guidelines for allocating the burdens of proof, when no assign-
ment has been made by statute. Despite their apparent vagueness, these terms
can be given some precise content. When viewed in terms of the substantive ex-
planations provided by Professor Cleary, these principles clearly serve as a
comprehensive and rational method for allocating burdens of proof on substan-
tive law questions.
III. PREVIOUS TREATMENT OF BURDEN ALLOCATION IN
PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS
No analysis such as Cleary's has been applied to the allocation of burdens
of production and persuasion in preliminary determinations of fact governing
the admissibility of evidence. This area, in effect, is in the same state of juristic
immaturity in which Cleary found allocations in substantive questions over
twenty years ago. Wigmore only briefly addressed the question, and early
codifications of the law of evidence only provided confusing"' or vague' rules.
At present, the trial judge's discretion, the concomitant paucity of appellate
54 See, e.g., 13 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LrrIGATION GUIDE S 301.01 (1981).
55 Cleary, supra note 23, at 13.
56 Id.
" Id.
'a Id.
56 Id. at 13-14. But see Ball, The Momeng of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof,
14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 817-18 (1961) (party challenging the odds doubly disadvantaged, once
by the burden allocation, and again by jury estimation).
°° Ste infra text and notes at notes 72-75.
See infra text and notes at notes 76-88.
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review, and the nature of the process of ruling on objections have combined to
obscure the allocation issue. Participants only occasionally address the ques-
tion at all, and its resolution is at best common-sensical, and at worst, merely
habitual. The same light which Cleary shed on substantive principles must find
its way to the procedure of resolving admissibility disputes.
Wigmore made only a terse conclusory comment on the allocation of the
burden of proof in disputes concerning the admissibility of evidence.
[Title burden of establishing the preliminary facts essential to satisfy any
rule of evidence is upon the party offering it. The opponent merely invokes
the law; if it is applicable to the evidence, the proponent must make the
evidence satisfy the law.
To this general rule, there are a few exceptions, based (like all solutions of
the burden of proof) on experience and convenience in special classes of
cases . 62
In this short, uncharacteristically unfootnoted passage, Wigmore disposed of
the issue. By placing the burden upon the proponent of the evidence Wigmore,
in effect, adopts an anti-admissibility posture. Such a position is based upon
the assumption that the law of evidence is a barrier to proof, which must be
surmounted before information can be presented to the fact-finder. This exclu-
sionary bias, however, is inconsistent with the leading principles of the law of
evidence, 63 first articulated by Thayer. The first principle he articulated was
"that nothing should be received which is not logically probative. "64 Second,
everything which is probative should come in, "unless a clear ground of policy
or law excludes it. "65
If these conventionally accepted principles are indeed the ground of
modern evidence law, then important consequences for burden allocation
follow. The first principle expresses a policy that the proponent of the evidence
should carry the burden of demonstrating relevance. The second principle,
however, implies that the exclusion of relevant evidence should be exceptional;
whence it follows that the opponent of admission, i.e. the party relying upon
the exception to the general principle of admissibility of relevant evidence
should have the burden of proving the exception. 66 Wigmore's placement of
the burden of establishing the preliminary facts upon the party offering the
evidence conflicts with these basic principles. Allocations which are faithful to
those basic principles must be made according to more complex and more flex-
ible criteria.
The scholars who proposed codifications of evidence gave more detailed
consideration than Wigmore to the assignment of burdens in the issue of ad-
65 I J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, 18, at 347.
65 J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 530.
6. Id.
65 Id.
66 See F. JAMES & J. HAZARD, supra note 9, S 7.12, at 282-84 (burden on party asserting
exception to general rule). See also G. _Fr ETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 5 7.2.1, at 520
(1978).
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missibility. The first significant attempt to codify the law of evidence
culminated in 1942 with the approval of the Model Code of Evidence by the
American Law Institute. 67
 The Code specifically addressed the issue of alloca-
tion in Rule 11, which imposed the burden of proof generally on the proponent
of the evidence except where there was an implicit decision to allocate it other-
wise, as indicated by the use of the term "unless." 68 Although the Model Code
was complex, it showed that codification of the law of evidence could be ac-
complished." The Code was valuable in directing attention to the issues of
preliminary fact finding, and in creating an explicit mechanism for allocating
burdens of production and persuasion. The Code was bottomed upon "a
sweeping declaration that all relevant evidence is admissible, that no person is
67
 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
" Id., Rule 11, at 87. Rule 11 provides as•follows:
Rule 11. Preliminary Hearing By Judge.
When the qualification or disqualification of a person to be a witness, the ad-
missibility or inadmissibility of relevant evidence, or the existence or non-existence
of a privilege is stated in these Rules to be subject to a condition and the fulfillment
of the condition is in issue, the issue is to be determined by the judge, and
(a) each party is entitled to present evidence and to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses as to the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition at a preliminary
hearing to be held by the judge in or out of the presence of the jury, as he may in
his discretion prescribe;
(b) subject to Rule 704 (rule governing effect of presumption), the proponent of the wit-
ness or evidence or the claimant of the privilege has both the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of persuasion of the fulfillment of the condition, except that the opponent has
both burdens when
(i) the statement of the condition upon which such qualification, admissibility,
or existence depends begins with the word "unless," or
(ii) the statement of the condition upon which such disqualification, inadmissi-
bility or non-existence depends begins otherwise than with the word "un-
less."
Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
e9
	Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.AJ.
23, 25 (1942) (Rule 11 is cited as one of the "[I]engthy rules of complex syntax."). A review of
sections of the Model Code quickly shows the difficulty of interpreting Rule 11. The advantages
contemplated by its drafters were not apparent to commentators. Even with a copy of the Code in
hand, the application of Rule 11 would not be an easy task. The comment accompanying Rule 11
illustrates its complexity:
When the statement of a condition of the qualification of a witness or admissibility of
evidence or existence of a privilege begins with "if," as in Rule 204 [witness' privi-
lege against self-incrimination] or is phrased in terms not involving the use of "if"
or "unless," both burdens are normally upon the party presenting the witness or of-
fering the evidence or claiming the privilege; when the statement begins with "un-
less", as in Rule 101, [witness competency] both burdens are upon his adversary.
On the other hand, when the statement is of a condition of disqualification, inadmis-
sibility or non-existence, as in Rule 227 (2), [state secrets privilege] the proponent
has both burdens if the statement begins with "unless"; otherwise the opponent has
both burdens.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 11, comment (1942). See Gard, The Uniform Rules of Evidence,
31 TuL. L. REV. 19, 23-24 (1956) (Model Code unpopular because of [1] broad discretion of
trial judge, [2] virtual abolition of rule against hearsay where declarant is unavailable, [3] com-
plexity [citing Rule 11], and [4] rules of privilege). See also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURC, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1193.94, 1194 n.5 (1977).
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incompetent as a witness and that there is no privilege to refuse to be a witness
or to disclose relevant matter or to prevent another from disclosing it." True
to its premises, the Model Code usually assigned the burdens of production
and persuasion to the opponent of the admission of logically relevant
evidence."
The Model Code of Evidence was an important step in the modern
codification movement, but the ALI was unsuccessful in urging its adoption."
After World War II, the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
turned their attention to evidence, and, using the Model Code as a basis,"
drafted the Uniform Rules of Evidence." Like the authors of the Model Code,
the drafters of the Uniform Rules began "with the traditional idea that all rele-
vant evidence is admissible unless affirmatively excluded or limited." The
Uniform Rules expressly addressed the allocations issue in Rule 8, governing
preliminary fact determinations, placing allocations of the burdens within the
discretion of the trial judge. 76 As Professor Morgan noted, the "rule makes no
attempt to allocate the burden of evidence or the burden of persuasion on the
preliminary question."'" Since the allocation is discretionary, it would not
2° MORGAN, Foreword, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 11 (1942).
2' See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 101 (competency of witnesses); Rule 212
(attorney-client privilege exception); Rule 217 (marital privilege exception); Rule 222
(physician-patient privilege exception); Rule 224 (refusal to reveal religious belief Unless
material); Rule 225 (refusal to reveal vote in a political election unless judge finds it was cast il-
legally); Rule 227 (refusal to reveal a state secret unless judge finds it is not a matter of state
secret or chief officer of governmental department has consented); Rule 229 (communication to
grand jury); Rule 230 (identity of informer); Rule 231 (waiver of privilege by contract or
previous disclosure). But see, e.g. , Rule 204 (privilege against self-incrimination); Rule 210
(attorney-client privilege); Rule 215 (marital privilege); Rule 219 (priest-penitent privilege);
Rule 221 (communication between physician and patient); Rule 226 (trade secrets); Rule 228
(official information of government). These rules all allocated the burden to the opponent of
logically relevant evidence.
72 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 1, 5005, at 86-89 (Code attacked by
many, including Wigmore and was nowhere adopted); McCormick, Some High Lights of the
Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEX. L. REV. 559, 559 (1955) (No state accepted the Model Code as
authority, perhaps because it was thought too radical in its reforms and overly academic in
style.).
25 UNIF. R. OF EVID., prefatory note, at 161 (1953).
7+ UNIF. R. OF EVID. (1953).
25 Id. , prefatory note, at 163.
7° Id. at Rule 8. Rule 8 provides as follows:
Rule 8. Preliminary Inquiry by Judge. When the qualification of a person to be a
witness, or the admissibility of evidence, or the existence of a privilege is stated in
these rules to be subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in
issue, the issue is to be determined by the judge, and he shall indicate to the parties
which one has the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof on such
issue as implied by the rule under which the question arises. The judge may hear
and determine such matters out of the presence or hearing of the jury, except that on
the admissibility of a confession the judge, if requested, shall hear and determine the
question out of the presence and hearing of the jury. But this rule shall not be con-
strued to limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to
weight or credibility.
Id.
77 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 51 (1962).
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necessarily have been consistent with the "traditional idea" at the basis of the
rules.
The drafters of the Uniform Rules were clearly dissatisfied with Model
Code Rule 11. In the Comment to their Rule 8, they acknowledge their
somewhat drastic modification of the very complicated Rule 11 of the ALI
Model Code. Several new features should be noted:
(a) Simplification in leaving the determination of burdens on preliminary
matters to common sense rather than rule of thumb .. . . 78
The complexity of Model Code Rule 11 belies its characterization as a "rule of
thumb." Moreover, the judge's discretionary allocations of burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion under Rule 8, guided only by implication from "the
rule under which the question arises," may not have infallibly reflected "com-
mon sense." Further, not every trial judge would have perceived the implica-
tion in the same way, and allocations would not have been predictable to the
litigants.
The latest and most influential stage in the evidence codification was the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Rule 104 governs the determina-
tion of preliminary questions.'" It describes the preliminary questions which
may be disputed: "The qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence. "" The rule is silent on the
allocation of the burden of persuasion in preliminary disputes, 83 leaving the
issue to judicial development. The shift of the law of evidence from a common
law basis to a statutory one adds a new element to the analysis of burden alloca-
tion. In a statutory framework, the first place to look for assignment of burdens
is to the language of the governing statute." As Professor Cleary noted,
however, statutes are often drafted without sufficient consideration of their pro-
cedural consequences. 85
 Since Professor Cleary was the Reporter, it is ironic
that many of the Federal Rules of Evidence appear to have been drafted in this
way. Consequently, before a system for allocating burdens of proof on
preliminary fact questions can be developed, one must look to the policies em-
bodied in the various rules, as well as considerations of fairness and efficiency.
IV. BASES FOR BURDEN ALLOCATION ON PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
The leading commentators in evidence have devoted little attention to the
reasons for burden allocation in preliminary fact determinations, and the
" UNIF. R. OF EVID., Rule 8, comment (1954).
79 Id.
" Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1929 codified at 28 U.S.C. app. at
539 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
In FED. R. EVID. 104.
82 Id.
" No draft of the rules addressed the problem. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 196-99 (1972)
(Supreme Court transmission to Congress); 51 F.R.D. 315, 325 -38 (1971) (March 1971 Draft);
46 F.R.D. 161, 186-91 (1969) (March 1969 Draft).
" See Cleary, supra note 23, at 8.
" Id.
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leading codifications have either been unclear or silent. Nonetheless, it is im-
portant to develop criteria which can guide courts in making these often crucial
decisions. When the court assigns the burdens of proof in preliminary fact
determinations, it should have a principled basis for its decision. In some cases,
the wording of the rule of evidence will imply a burden-allocation." In others,
where the wording is neutral, the considerations identified by Professor Cleary
for substantive law questions, policy, fairness and probability, should provide
the starting point in the search for guiding principles." Although vague, when
applied to specific cases and given substantive content, they offer considerable
guidance in making an allocation decision.
Policy, though difficult to define," is the most basic principle governing
burden allocation. When there is a controlling statute, it is often possible to
discern the purposes the statute was intended to serve. From these purposes, it
is usually possible to deduce a preference for particular results. An allocation of
the burdens of proof should be made so as to comply with this preference.
Many of the Federal Rules of Evidence imply a preference for a certain result,
whether it be exclusion or admission." The policy concerns reflected in the
purposes and embodied in the preference of a rule can be promoted by placing
the burden of proof in any given case on the party asserting the opposite of the
preferred result.
Policy considerations alone, however, should not control the allocation of
burdens. The approach of Uniform Rule 8 is that policy, "as implied by the
rule under which the question arises, " 90 should be the sole determinant. The
problem with making policy the sole determinant is that the policy implications
are not always indisputable. When the policy cannot be determined, the judge
has no other guide in making the allocation. There are other concerns, directly
related to the preliminary fact-finding process, which should also influence the
allocation of burdens. These other concerns, adapted from Cleary's model, are
fairness and efficiency.
Rule 102 of the Federal Rules indicates that interpretation of the rules
should seek "to secure fairness in administration. " 91 In the burden of proof
context, fairness to the parties focuses more on the process of obtaining
evidence than on the governing rule of evidence. 92 Yet, placing the burdens on
the party with greater access to means of proof does not, at least directly, im-
plement the policy of the governing rule. Rather, the allocation is based on the
notion that it would be unjust to burden the party who is less able to obtain the
86 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 403, 412(c)(2), 609(a)(1), 1003(1).
a 7 See supra text and notes at notes 41-59.
88 Cf. Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954) (public policy a
"will-o'-the wisp of the law [that] varies and changes,with the interests, habits, need, sentiments
and fashions of the day." Id. at 125, 82 S.E.2d at 558).
89 Ste supra note 86.
99 UNIF. R. OF EvID., Rule 8 (1953). See supra text and note at note 82.
91 FED. R. EVID. 102.
92 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, S 337; 91 WIGMORE, supra note 1, 5 2486 (Chad-
bourn_rev. 1981).
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means to overcome it. Because of its generality, this fairness rule may not guide
very effectively, except as a nostrum, particularly in the largely unregulated
area of preliminary determinations of fact. Fairness, therefore, supplements
policy as a criterion to guide the allocation of burdens. The imprecision of the
concept, however, limits its usefulness. One must look further for additional
guides in developing a comprehensive system for allocating burdens.
Another express goal of the Federal Rules, set out in Rule 102, is the
"elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." 93 This rule is concerned with
ensuring a satisfactory resolution of the dispute with a minimum cost in time
and money." Probability, as presented by Professor Cleary in the substantive
context, is one element of this general principle of efficiency. One way to max-
imize efficiency is to assume the existence of the probable state of affairs, and to
assign the burden of proving the improbable state of affairs to the party that is
asserting it. If that party fails to satisfy his'or her burden, the decision on ad-
missibility will likely correspond with the probable facts. Court time and effort
is not, therefore, wasted by requiring needless proof of likely facts.
Efficiency is broader than probability, however, in that it encompasses
several other factors which have been advanced to justify allocation of burdens.
First, convenience, broadly defined by McCormick as the natural order of
storytelling," is an element of efficiency. It requires less effort by the fact-
finder and often less time if the presentation of facts follows a logical progres-
sion. Second, burdens imposed to discourage the making of frivolous claims,
reflecting the need to conserve judicial resources, constitute an element of effi-
ciency." Finally, even allocating the burdens to the party with readier access to
means of proof reflects concerns of efficiency as well as of fairness, since it
would be less cumbersome for that party to present the proof than for his oppo-
nent to obtain it and to present it. 97 The general principle of efficiency thus en-
compasses Professor Cleary's concept of probability, as well as several other
principles which have been advanced as bases for burden allocation.
In preliminary questions especially, efficiency should be an important fac-
tor in many allocations: policy implications are not always clear; fairness is
vague; and a paramount goal is to return to the primary focus of the trial as
quickly and as inexpensively as possible. Despite the importance of efficiency,
however, no single one of the three basic concerns should consistently
predominate over the others. In some instances, policy may be so clear, or
fairness concerns so obvious, that efficiency should neither control, nor in-
fluence the allocation. Courts, however, rarely invoke these considerations ex-
95 FED. R. EVID. 102.
9♦ See generally Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and judicial Administration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
95 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 337, at 787.
96 See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, $ 11.2(b), at 506 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
97
 See supra text and notes at notes 48-51, 57.
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plicitly in allocating burdens of persuasion and production, but the placement
of the burdens necessarily either fosters or hinders the concerns of policy,
fairness and efficiency. Consequently, it is incumbent upon courts to consider
each of these concerns in allocating burdens. Only then will the policies
underlying the rules of evidence as well as fairness and efficiency be properly
served.
A review of the few appellate decisions that have addressed the allocation
of burdens in preliminary determinations of fact will help to illuminate the
hitherto obscure area of rulings on the admissibility of evidence. It will also in-
dicate that the courts are not consistently considering the basic relevant con-
cepts in assigning burdens. Finally, it will demonstrate how an application of
the factors of policy, fairness and efficiency to burden-allocation will assist
courts to reach better decisions.
V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF BURDEN ALLOCATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
This part of the article contains a review of the allocation of burdens on
preliminary questions under several provisions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Federal Rules are the object of study because of their impor-
tance, not only in federal practice, but also on the development of state
codifications of evidence." As has been noted, 99 the Federal Rules do not con-
tain an express provision addressing the allocation of the burdens. Generally,
therefore, the allocation is to be made by the judge with only the legislative
guidance found in the individual rules. In this article, the review of certain
Federal Rules includes an examination of the development and the wording of
the rules, their implications, and their application to the question of burdens.
In addition, the rules as interpreted will be evaluated in terms of the criteria for
allocating burdens: policy, fairness and efficiency.'"
Federal Rule 104, which deals with preliminary questions of fact, iden-
tifies three basic areas in which the trial court must make preliminary deter-
minations of fact: (1) the admissibility of evidence; (2) the qualification of
witnesses; and (3) the existence of a privilege.'" The rule's categorization of
the issues to be resolved by the trial judge provides a convenient structure for
the analysis of the imposition of burdens.
98
 The Federal Rules of Evidence were the model for the second Uniform Rules of
Evidence, proposed in 1974. See Usu. . R. Evin., 13 U.L.A. (1980). Either the Federal Rules or
the Uniform Rules have been the basis for codifications of evidence law in many states. See 1 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 11 (Supp. 1981).
99 See supra text and note at note 83.
100 See supra text and notes at notes 88-97.
10 ' FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Since Congress rejected the drafters' attempt to codify the law
relating to privilege, the allocation of burdens on questions relating to privilege claims has not
been affected. There are many subtle factors which influence the allocation of burdens in ques-
tions of privilege. Although treatment of these questions is not attempted in this article, the basic
considerations which have been identified will be the same.
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A. Admissibility of Evidence
When Rule 104(a) assigns the responsibility to the trial judge to make
preliminary determinations of fact "concerning ... the admissibility of
evidence," it means questions of admissibility other than those listed in the
Rule; the qualification of witnesses and privilege. 102 This section will examine
specific provisions of the Rules within the broad category of admissibility en-
compassing issues other than those specifically mentioned in the rule by focus-
ing on the issues which have most frequently involved the allocation of burdens
in the dispute over admissibility.
1. Relevance
Relevance is the most basic of the questions concerning the admissibility
of evidence. 103 Federal Rule 402 declares that 141 relevant evidence is ad-
missible," unless otherwise provided, and that "[e]vidence which is not rele-
vant is not admissible."'" The definition of relevance is provided in Rule 401:
evidence must affect the probability of facts of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action." 5 Often the probative relationship of the proffered evidence
to a material fact will be an obvious, logical one. 106 If the relationship is not ap-
parent to the court, however, it is clearly the proponent's responsibility to
establish it.'"
Rule 104 also governs determinations of preliminary issues relating to constitutional ex-
clusionary rules. See United States v. Lee, 541 F.2d 1145, 1146 (5th Cir. 1976). See also FED. R.
EVID. 1101(b). Separate lines of authority have developed on the allocation of burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion in suppression hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
171-72, 177-78 (1974) (burden on prosecution to show consent to search); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (burden on prosecution to show fifth amendment warnings have been
given). The burdens of production and persuasion generally have been assigned to the movant in
a suppression hearing. United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 932 (1977). In De La Fuente, the court noted that in several classes of cases, once the
movant ',flakes a primary showing of illegality, the burden of persuasion to justify admissibility
will be placed upon the prosecution. Id. at 533-34. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
511.2, at 506-12 (1978).
102 Also excluded from this assignment of responsibility are those questions which are
reserved for the jury by Rule 104(b). FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
105 See J. THAYER, supra note 17, at 264-65.
10+ FED. R. EVID. 402.
1°5 FED. R. EVID. 401.
1D6 See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 1, 5 5166, at 68 (once an objection is
made, the proponent will generally state the purpose for which the evidence is offered to establish
relevancy). See generally 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 96, at 681 (judge in deter-
mining whether evidence is relevant should focus on the purpose fot which it is being offered).
107 See, e. g. , United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 355 (2d Cir. 1978) (evasion of cor-
porate income taxes; testimony that building had a useful life of only five years not probative of
fact the building was valueless during the tax years in question); United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d
257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977) (court did not err in excluding such items as newspaper clippings
because the party offering them made no attempt to explain their relevancy to his theory of the
case); Harris v. United States, 371 F.2d 365, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1967) (while testimony regarding
payment of a government informer-witness was relevant, because the ruling against its admission
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If the relevance of the evidence is dependent upon other facts, then under
Rule 104(b), the judge will admit the evidence if there is sufficient evidence to
support a finding of the underlying facts."° The ultimate decision on condi-
tional relevance is for the jury,'" but the proponent must meet the sufficiency
standard, and also convince the jury of the connection that supports relevance.
Since the proponent bears the burden of showing conditional relevance under
Rule 104(b), a fortiori it is the proponent's burden to show relevance where it is
not dependent upon connecting facts, and the decision is one for the judge
under Rule 104(a). 110
Although the proponent carries the burden of proving relevance, where
there has been some explanation of the relevance of evidence, the trial court
has some duty to assist in the development of testimony that would completely
establish the relevance. In Keohane v. New York Ceneral R. Co.,"' the plaintiff
had indicated the purpose of evidence he sought to introduce: to establish the
defective condition of an elevator before and after an accident.'" When proper
follow-up questions were not posed by counsel, the court dismissed the
witnesses." 3
 In reversing, the Second Circuit held that it "would have been
preferable" for the trial judge either to examine the witness himself or to in-
struct counsel how to do so."• This unusual case illustrates by exception how
the demonstration of relevancy is normally a responsibility of the proponent.
The placement of this responsibility on the proponent is justified by all
three basic considerations, although courts do not articulate them. Exclusion of
irrelevant evidence is the most basic policy of the law of evidence. "s That the
proponent of evidence must show the court that proferred evidence is relevant
complies with this basic policy. In addition, the proponent is likely to know
how the evidence relates to the issues in dispute so fairness concerns are not
violated. That is, the opponent of admissibility is not required to show the
absence of probative value, when he may know little or nothing about the
disputed evidence. Such a requirement could easily be characterized as unfair.
Finally, having the proponent of evidence explain how it relates to the action is
certainly the most efficient way to proceed. The proponent's burden will usual-
ly be satisfied by an explanation of the logical relationship between the
evidence and the facts of consequence to the action." 6 The definition of
was discretionary and because the relevancy was not made clear to the trial judge, the ruling was
sustained).
'°° FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
1 °9 Id. advisory committee note.
"° 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 96, at 681.
t" 418 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1969).
"2 Id. at 479.
"3 Id. at 480.
" 4 Id. at 480 n.5.
t" J. THAYER, supra note 17, 264-65. See supra text and notes at notes 64-66.
"6
 See supra text and notes at notes 106-07.
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relevance contained in Rule 401 is a liberal one, favoring admissibility, and the
courts and commentators have noted that, in cases of doubt, evidence should
be admitted since the jury is capable of according it the proper weight when it is
only of slight probative value."'
2. Countervailing Factors Leading to the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence:
Rule 403
A countervailing policy is that highly prejudicial evidence, even if rele-
vant, should be barred. The exclusionary rules of evidence are either specific
implementations of the rule that relevant evidence is admissible or exceptions
to it. Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, of confusion
of the issues or of misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 8 This discre-
tionary" 8 authority to exclude relevant evidence has antecedents in the Model
Code of Evidence' 20 and in the Uniform Rules.'" In the Model Code, an ap-
plication of the allocation guidelines contained in Rule 11 indicates that the
burden was placed upon the opponent to make a showing supporting exclu-
sion. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules has likewise been considered to place the
burden of proof on the objector.' 22
The wording of Rule 403 implies that the burden of justifying exclusion
should be upon the opponent of the evidence. When Rule 403 is invoked, the
court is dealing with concededly relevant evidence ("Although relevant"),
which, as has been discussed,'" is favored evidence. An objection on Rule 403
grounds is a request to the court to exercise its discretion to exclude the
evidence.'" The judge must evaluate the probative value of the proffered
" 7
 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 30, at 215 (judge's approach should
favor admissibility).
118 FED. R. EvID. 403.
19 In early drafts of the Rules, exclusion of relevant evidence was mandatory if pro-
bative value was substantially outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues
or misleading the jury. Exclusion was discretionary on the basis of considerations of undue delay,
waste of time or cumulation. See 51 F.R.D. 315, 345-46 (1971); 46 F.R.D. 161, 225-27 (1969).
Even after the elimination of the dichotomy, the retention of the two categories, "dangers" and
"considerations" indicates that the former are to be accorded greater weight. Courts often use all
the counterweights in analysis. See, e.g., Benna v. Reeder Flying Serv., Inc., 578 F.2d 269, 274
(9th Cir. 1978) (prejudice, confusion of issues and delay).
10 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303 (1942) ("judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is outweighed" by risk of (1) waste of time; (2) undue
prejudice, confusion or misleading the jury; (3) unfair surprise).
11 UNIF. R. OF EVID. 45 (1953) (judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by (1) waste of time; (2) undue prejudice, confusion,
misleading the jury; or (3) surprise). Unlike the Model Code and the Uniform Rules, the Federal
Rules do not include surprise as a ground justifying exclusion.
' 22 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, S 185, at 56 n.30 (Supp. 1978).
' 23 See supra text and notes at notes 115-17.
' 24 See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 1, S 5224, at 318-20.
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evidence, and then estimate the countervailing factors listed in the Rule.
Arguably the opponent should specify the particular reason for exclusion. 125
Only if the court finds that the probative value, estimated at its maximum im-
pact 128 in the context of the trial"' is substantially outweighed by one or more
of the counterweights, estimated at its likely impact,' 28 may it then exercise its
discretion to exclude.'" The inclusion of the modifier "substantially" in-
dicates that the balance is rigged in favor of admissibility. In cases of doubt
whether the probative value is substantially outweighed, the evidence should
be admitted.'"
Rule 403 is as close to an explicit statement as will be found in the Federal
Rules with respect to allocating the burdens of proof on the question of exclu-
sion."' Often, rather than involving disputed issues of fact, a Rule 403 deci-
sion requires an application of the criteria in the Rule. By weighting the
balance in favor of admissibility, the Rule impliedly requires the opponent of
evidence, first, to show that the balance disfavors probative value, and second,
to justify the court's exercise of discretion.
An example of the measurement of probative value appears in United States
a. Haldeman.'" There, the District of Columbia Circuit explicitly evaluated the
probative value of evidence of defendant Ehrlichman's involvement in the
Ellsberg-Fielding burglary, admitted at his trial for conspiracy, obstruction of
justice, and perjury.'" The court discussed how the evidence "could well have
allowed the jury to find a definite link between the two events."'" It could be
found, for instance, that concealing responsibility for the earlier break-in was
part of the motive for concealing involvement in the Watergate break-in.'"
Evidence of the Ellsberg-Fielding break-in, moreover, might be found relevant
to a co-conspirator's threats to reveal information about prior crimes corn-
'" Id. at 319.
In See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 101-02
(3d ed. 1982) (give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force; citing 1 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 41, i 403[03], at 403-18 ["usual approach • . is to give the evidence
its maximum reasonable probative force"]).
122 See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 1, 5 5214, at 273 (judge needs to con-
sider the proffered evidence against the background of all the evidence in the case).
128 See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 126, at 102 ("likely prejudicial impact"
of the evidence is the other balancing factor). But see 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
41, i 403[03], at 403-18 ("usual approach is to give evidence its ... minimal reasonable
prejudicial value").
129 See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 1, 5 5214, at 263-64 (under these cir-
cumstances the judge is not required to exclude the evidence, but he "may" do so).
' 20 Id. 5 5221, at 309 (the purpose of setting the standard at "substantially outweighed"
is to further the policy of favoring the admissibility of evidence).
131 See also FED. R, EvID. 602, 609, 901. The residual hearsay exceptions establish more
explicit procedures than any other provisions of the Rules. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
"2 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
13 See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Ehrlichman was
convicted of conspiring to violate civil rights and of perjury. Id. at 913).
134 559 F.2d, at 89.
135 Id.
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mitted for the White House, as well as to Ehrlichman's defense that he con-
sistently urged full disclosure. ' 38
 The court then weighed these findings of
relevance against the asserted prejudice, specifically that the presentation of
such a large amount of evidence in effect resulted in retrying Ehrlichman on
the earlier charges,'" that the evidence introduced was the most damning
evidence of defendant's guilt on the prior charges,"8 and that defendant was
forced to abandon the presentation of character witnesses because they would
be asked questions about the prior convictions. 139
 The court concluded that the
challenged evidence was admissible, since "the probative value of the Ellsberg-
Fielding break-in far outweighed its prejudicial effect.'""
A rare example of appellate reversal of a trial court decision under Rule
403 is Ballou v. Henri'Studios, Inc. 141
 In this wrongful death case, the defendant
sought to introduce the results of a blood alcohol test to show that the plaintiffs'
decedent was driving while intoxicated and was therefore contributorily
negligent. 142
 By pretrial motion, the plaintiffs asked the court to exclude
evidence of the test, and introduced testimony that no one had detected the
presence of alcohol around the body,'" as well as testimony that the decedent
was not intoxicated ten minutes before the accident.'" The trial court excluded
the evidence " 'because of the lack of credibility of the tests,' " and because it
was " `too harmful' " and " 'extremely prejudicial.' "145 Reversing, the Fifth
Circuit found an abuse of discretion.'" The assessment of credibility should
have been left to the jury. 147
 In determining admissibility under Rule 403, the
probative value of the proffered evidence is to be gauged as if it were true.'" In
this case, the probative value of the decedent's intoxication on the issue of con-
tributory negligence was deemed to be very high.'" On the other side of the
balance, the appellate court held that, although the evidence would have hurt
the plaintiffs' case, it would not hurt it unfairly, and the prejudicial effect was
"comparatively slight. ' 180
 Therefore, the court found "as a matter of law that
136 Id. at 89-90.
133 Id. at 90.
"a Id. (noting that the alternative would have been the introduction of evidence which
was less probative and more prejudicial).
133 Id. at 91 n.160.
14° Id. at 91.
656 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981).
14 ' 656 F.2d at 1149.
113 Id. at 1151.
Id. In addition, plaintiffs challenged the authentication of the test, and the trial court
agreed. The Fifth Circuit also reversed that ruling. Id. at 1151 and n.2, 1154-55.
"3 Id. at 1151-52 (quoting the trial court).
16 Id. at 1154. See United States v. Tibbetts, 565 F.2d 867, 869 (4th Cir. 1977) (reversal
only for "grave abuse" of discretion); United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir.
1977) (reversal only if trial judge "has clearly abused his discretion").
'" 656 F.2d at 1154.
'4° Id.
19 Id. at 1155.
'3° Id.
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the potential for unfair prejudice of the blood alcohol test did not substantially
outweigh its probative value. "151
The guidelines for allocating burdens on preliminary questions are il-
lustrated by these decisions. First, one policy of Rule 403 is the same as that of
Rules 401 and 402: liberality in the admission of evidence. 152 In fact, this policy
is even more persuasive in the context of discretionary exclusion, where the
relevance determination precedes the question of exclusion. The policy of Rule
403 is that exclusion is justified only in those cases in which the specified
dangers and considerations substantially outweigh probative value. This policy
mandates that a party seeking to keep probative evidence from the fact-finder
should show why the evidence should be excluded. The opponent of the
evidence should be able to explain why the balance favors exclusion, and why
the court should exercise its discretion to exclude. Nor is this placement of the
burden unfair, since the Rule 403 balancing is one which is not usually done on
the basis of disputed preliminary facts; it is simply a matter of convincing the
judge of the relative merits of the advantages and disadvantages of the prof-
fered evidence. Therefore, in most cases, the opponent of admissibility will not
be less able to bear the burden. Finally, this placement of the burden is the
most efficient, since the opponent of the evidence can more easily explain
precisely how the evidence will result in prejudice to his case or in confusion of
the issues, as Ehrlichman attempted to do in Haldeman. Nevertheless, the policy
consideration is by far the most important in allocating the burdens, since ex-
clusion of relevant evidence is strongly disfavored.
3. Concrete Applications of Balancing Tests
a. Other acts evidence: Rule 404(b)
Rule 404(b) is one of the specific applications of the general principles in
Rules 401-403.' 5 ' The first sentence of the Rule provides that "[E]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith."'" It should be noted
that the rule excludes such evidence only when offered for the stated
purpose. 155 The second sentence of the Rule provides that evidence of other
acts "may ... be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident." 156 Thus where evidence may reflect upon the character
131 Id. at 1154.
' 32 See supra text and notes at notes 104 and 115-17.
1 " FED, R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note ("The rules which follow in this Article
are concrete applications evolved for particular situations. "); Rule 402 advisory committee note
("Succeeding rules in the present article, in response to the demands of particular policies, re-
quire the exclusion of evidence despite its relevancy.").
134 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
133 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 188.
136 Fan. R. EVID. 404(b). The list is not exclusive. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
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of the opposing party, it is not admissible unless it is found to be relevant to an
independent permissible purpose. Even where such a permissible purpose is
found, the evidence is still subject to the limitations upon admissibility imposed
by Rule 403. 157
As noted, under Rule 403, the burden is allocated to the opponent of ad-
mission. Since Rule 404(b) is a specific application of the principle of Rule 403,
one might expect the burden to be placed on the opponent of admissibility to
show that the evidence is in fact being misused as character evidence and
should be excluded. Considerations of policy, fairness and efficiency, however,
counsel differently. In United States v. Beechum,"a the defendant, a postal
employee, was convicted of unlawful possession of an old silver dollar which he
knew to be stolen from the mails.'" At the time of his arrest, he was in posses-
sion of two credit cards which were not in his name.' 6° The government in-
troduced the cards with the obvious purpose of establishing Beechum's intent
to possess the silver dollar unlawfully.' 6 ' Beechum testified that he had in-
tended to turn in the silver dollar; 162
 a defense allegedly undercut by his posses-
sion of the credit cards which he had held for nearly a year.' 63
 A Fifth Circuit
panel reversed the admission of the credit cards,'" holding that, although the
offenses were similar enough, the government had not sufficiently established
the prior offense by "plain, clear and convincing evidence. 5165
The panel decision was vacated by the court en bane.' 66
 The en banc court
held that "the relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from the defendant's
indulging himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of both the ex-
trinsic and charged offenses." 167
 That he indulged himself depends upon a
showing that the defendant committed the prior act, so "the government must
offer proof demonstrating that the defendant committed the offense. "168 The
supra note 9, 140, at 121-45 (Other reasons for which the evidence may be offered are: (I) to
show the whole context of the act; (2) to rebut an entrapment defense; (3) to show fear on the
part of the victim; (4) to show a modus operandi.).
'" See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee note; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 41, 1 404[191, at 404-117 (proponent of the evidence must convince the trial judge that
Rule 403 does not require exclusion of the evidence). See also United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d
207, 212-13 (1st Cir. 1978) (need to consider the possible prejudicial effect of propensity
evidence).
' 5" 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
19
 582 F.2d at 903. The defendant was convicted under 18 U,S.C. $ 1708 (1976).
160
 582 F.2d at 904.
16 ' Id. at 909.
162 Id. at 905.
16' Id. at 909.
164
 United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated en bane, 582 F.2d 898
(5th Cir. 1978).
163 Id. at 492. See United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973), overruled,
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
166 582 F.2d at 918.
167
 Id. at 911.
'" Id. at 912-13. See also United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1981)
(as a predicate to the admission of an extrinsic act, the government must show that the defendant
did it). The court also found that this was a situation of conditional relevance and that the pros-
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prosecution must also establish how proof of the other act is evidence for one of
the permissible purposes.' 69 Finally, the proponent must show the need for the
evidence, in light of all the circumstances."°
The court stated further that once probative value has been established,
the risk of prejudice must be analyzed."' The prejudice of other crimes
evidence was recognized as "inherent," 1 " which means that, although the op-
ponent of relevant evidence must demonstrate unfair prejudice in order to
justify its exclusion,'" where the evidence is of other crimes, wrongs or acts,
prejudice is assumed. "4 The battle lines are drawn on the probative value of
the evidence: its certainty, its relationship to the defendant, and its relationship
to a permissible purpose." 5
Since the key concern is the probative value of a prior act, as it relates to a
permissible purpose, the policy consideration clearly militates in favor of plac-
ing the burden to show admissibility of prior act evidence upon its proponent.
Not only must the proponent show relevance, under Rule 401, but also the
proponent must relate the proffered evidence to a purpose other than propensi-
ty, a use prohibited by Rule 404(a), 16 as well as Rule 404(b). Since the pro-
ecution, therefore, needed only to make a showing under Rule 104(b), "sufficient to support a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition." Id. at 913. This portion of the Beechum holding has
been criticized justly as a bad misconception. See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5
140, at 57 (Supp. 1981); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note I, S 5249, at 173 (Supp.
1981). Rule 404(b) is a "concrete application" of Rule 403; the major concern is with unfair
prejudice inherent in other crimes evidence. That concern dictates that the decision on ad-
missibility is for the judge alone under Rule 104(a); otherwise the prejudice is realized upon the
conditional admission of the evidence.
169 See 582 F.2d at 911 n.15; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 404[19], at
404-117 (The proponent of the evidence has the burden of proving that the prior act has relevan-
cy to a fact in issue other than propensity.).
"° See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978) (Probity must be
considered with regard for the availability of other evidence to show one of the permissible pur-
poses, the similarity of the prior act to the charged offense, the distance in time between the acts,
and the posture of the case.). See also United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1057 (5th Cir.
1981); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 140, at 116-17.
'" 582 F.2d at 913-14.
"2 Id. at 910. See also United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 5 46, at 139 (1978) ("great potential for prejudice inherent in other-
crimes evidence").
'" See supra text and notes at notes 118-52.
14 The prejudicial impact of the evidence can be affected by the way it is presented. See
United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1057 (5th Cir. 1981). Prejudice is heavily weighted in
the 403 balance, so that the need for the evidence is an element in its "incremental" probative
value to be weighed against inherent unfair prejudice. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914. Opposing a
proffer of other crimes evidence under Rule 404(b) does not require a showing of prejudice; that
is a given.
12 "[T]here is no presumption that other-crime evidence is relevant.... `[C]aution
and judgment are called for, and a trial judge faced with an other-crime evidence problem should
require the Government to explain why the evidence is relevant and necessary.' " United States
v. DeVaughn, 601 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38,
43 (2d Cir. 1978)). See also United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523-25 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
"6 FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (evidence of a person's character is "not admissible for the
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hibition on character evidence is so adamant, the proponent can justly be asked
to articulate his theory of the case, and the resulting need for his dangerous
evidence. Fairness as well as policy supports this allocation, just as it is fair to
ask the proponent of evidence to establish relevance, 17 since he will better be
able to explain the precise relationship of the proffered evidence to a permis-
sible purpose. Finally, asking the proponent to explain the permissible use of
the evidence is the most efficient approach; else the opponent of the evidence
must necessarily speculate upon his adversary's approach to the prosecution of
the case." 8
 Although under Rule 403 exclusion must be justified by the oppo-
nent of the evidence, the reverse is true under Rule 404(b). Unfair prejudice is
already posited in the balance; the evaluation of probative value is deter-
minative. The proponent must show that the probative value, as it relates to
some permissible purpose, is not substantially outweighed by its inherent un-
fair prejudice. This allocation is supported by policy, fairness and efficiency.
b. Impeachment by prior convictions: Rule 609
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules, which addresses the use of prior convictions
to impeach the credibility of witnesses, demonstrates a lucid approach to a
complex scheme of policy issues. Its arduous development illustrates the dif-
ficulty of the policies that are involved and hence deserves analysis. The alloca-
tion decisions emerge directly from the policy implications and exhibit clearly
the issues involved in allocating burdens of proof on evidentiary issues.
At common law, a person who had been convicted of a felony or of a
misdemeanor involving dishonesty was incompetent to testify. 19 Although this
categorical incompetency was eventually rejected, the prior convictions of a
witness came to be used to impeach his credibility, more for historical reasons
than for reasons of relevance.' 80
 Indeed, the relevance is difficult to
demonstrate: the reasoning generally set forth is that a conviction indicates bad
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion").
'" See supra text and notes at notes 115-16.
"a In United States v. Foskey, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that trial courts do
"not have the luxury of engaging in the type of careful balancing," which is often undertaken in
appellate opinions. 636 F.2d 517, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court suggested:
[fin future cases the Government should exercise the discretion given it by Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(d)(1) and notify the defense before trial of its intention to introduce any
evidence of prior bad acts. If the defense then raises a motion to suppress, the
Government should supply the district court with a written analysis of the logical in-
ferences justifying admission of the evidence. Given the complexity of these ques-
tions, and the ease of confusion of permissible with impermissible inferences, such a
procedure might obviate the need for the district court, as well as the court of ap-
peals, to speculate regarding the Government's theory of the evidence's relevance to
the issues listed in Rule 404(b).
Id. at 526 n.8.
179 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 4, S 43, at 84; see also infra text and notes at notes
474-81.
180 See Ladd, Credibility Tests — Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 174-80 (1940).
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general character and bad general character indicates lack of credibility. 1 e' The
prejudicial impact of this evidence, however, is clearer than its relevance.
Without regard to credibility, the jury may be influenced by the bad character
of the witness to decide the case on grounds other than rational ones.'" Prej-
udice is exacerbated when the witness is a party and it is most severe when the
witness is a defendant or a defense witness in a criminal case.
Given the doubtful relevance and the obvious prejudice of impeachment
by prior convictions, many courts began to abandon the rule of automatic ad-
missibility, and to balance the relevance of the impeachment evidence against
its prejudicial effect.'" The most important of these decisions was Luck v.
United States.'" In Luck, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial
judge had discretion to prohibit impeachment of a criminal defendant by prior
convictions. 185 Later decisions amplified the Luck reasoning, and provided that
the burden was on the defendant to justify exclusion of the impeaching
evidence, by showing that its prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative
value.'" Congress abolished the Luck doctrine in the District of Columbia in
1970.' 87
It was against this background that the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence considered the problem of prior conviction impeachment. Rule 609
was one of the most controversial provisions of the Federal Rules,'" and its
drafting history has been accurately described as "labyrinthine.'" 88 The Ad-
visory Committee's first draft simply followed the common law, permitting im-
peachment of a witness by evidence of a prior conviction for a felony or a crime
involving false statement.'" The Committee's second, unpublished, draft per-
181 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1 609[02], at 609-54 (person with a
criminal past has a bad character and such a person is the sort who would disregard the oath to
testify truthfully).
1 " United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting from en banc opinion) (no matter how dishonest a burglar, robber or thief may be,
evidence of such past crimes is excluded), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980).
1 " See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 43, at 89-90; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 41, 't 609[03], at 609-60 n.1.
1 " 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41,
609[03], at 609-60 & n.2.
1 " 348 F.2d at 767-68.
186 See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.)
(stating that Luck contemplated the defendant bearing the burden of convincing the court to
withhold past conviction from the jury), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Brown v. United
States, 370 F.2d 242, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1 " D.C. CODE ENCYCL. 305(b)(1) (West Supp. 1970), District of Columbia Court
Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 5 133(a) (1970).
188 See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 314, at 284-303 (subdivision (a)
went through no less than six different drafts); 10 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
609.01[1.-2], at VI-99 (2d ed. 1976).
'as
	
States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
'9° 46 F.R.D. 161, 295-96 (1969):
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
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mitted impeachment by a felony conviction "unless the judge finds that the
conviction is lacking in probative value on the issue of credibility."'" This for-
mulation explicitly posed the question of relevancy.' 92 Its wording implied that
the burden of showing the lack of probative value would have fallen upon the
opponent of the evidence. 193 A later draft incorporated language identical to
that used in Rule 403: the evidence was to be admissible "unless ... the judge
determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.'"" Again, the burden of show-
ing inadmissibility would have been imposed upon the opponent.'" The Rule
was submitted by the Supreme Court in the form which the Advisory Commit-
tee had initially proposed.' 96
 As it emerged from Congress, the Rule permits
impeachment by felony convictions "if ... the court determines that the pro-
bative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the de-
fendant. '" 97 The Rule as enacted also permits impeachment with a conviction
for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement, without requiring any
balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect.'" Rule 609(a) addresses
the question of impeachment only as it affects criminal defendants;' 99 the rule
does not address prejudice to prosecution witnesses, or to witnesses in civil
cases. 200
With regard to evidence of a prior conviction for a felony, 20 ' where the
crime did not involve dishonesty or false statement, Congress clearly meant to
change the allocation of the burden on admissibility and to place it on the pro-
ponent, the prosecution, to show that the probative value outweighed the
damage to the defendant. 202 Thus, the proponent must demonstrate probative
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
Id.
19' See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1 609[01], at 609-47.
1 " Id.
t" Cf MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 11 (1942) (opponent of the evidence has the
burdens of production and persuasion when the condition upon which inadmissibility depends
begins with "unless"): supra text and notes at notes 67-71.
194 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971). See generally 31 WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41,
609101], at 609-47-48.
'" Cf supra text and notes at notes 118-52.
' 96 56 F.R.D. 183, 269-70 (1972); see supra note 190.
197 FED. R. EV1D. 609(a)(1).
'9a Id. (a)(2).
199 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 316, at 324-25 nn. 26-27; see S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 126, at 365-66.
200 Id. Rule 403 may limit impeachment in these cases; "it is still an open question." 3
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 11609[06], at 609-89-90; see United States v. Nevitt,
563 F.2d 406, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Martin,
562 F.2d 673, 680-81 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Thorne, 547 F.2d 56, 58-59 (8th
Cir. 1976).
20 ' The language of Rule 609(a) is a "crime punishable by death or imprisonment in ex-
cess of one year." FED. R. EVID. 609(a). See 18 U.S.C. S 1 (1976); 3 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 316, at 322-23.
2°2
	 120 CoNG. REC. H 40,891 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate);
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value. The relationship of the prior conviction to credibility is the most impor-
tant element in probative value. 203 Convictions sought to be used under Rule
609(a)(1) have probative value on a sliding scale proportionate to the relation-
ship of the underlying offense to credibility. 204 For instance, crimes of violence
typically do not have high probative value on the issue of credibility, and
therefore, for purposes of Rule 609, will not be found highly probative. 2°5
Previous violent behavior has not been thought to relate directly to the propen-
sity for truth-telling. By contrast, where the prior offense "involved dishonesty
or false statement," it is as noted automatically admissible under Rule
609(a)(2). 206
A second component of probative value is the remoteness of the prior con-
viction. The older a conviction is, the less it presumably reveals about the
witness' character for truthfulness at the present time. 207 A fluid, and common-
sense interpretation of Rule 609(a)(1) would indicate that the assessment of
probative value should take into account the age of the conviction. A nine-year
old conviction is much less probative than a two-year old conviction for the
same offense. This interpretation is supported by Rule 609(b), which imposes
much stricter criteria on the use of convictions which are more than ten years
old:205 Yet the concern which Congress expressed over impeachment by remote
convictions cannot be met solely by the bright-line test of Rule 609(b); it must
also be considered when convictions are less than ten years old as well.'" The
witness' conduct since the prior conviction is also a significant factor in pro-
bative value . 2 '°
Finally, if the credibility issue is central, if the case is "a swearing
contest, then the assessment of the probative value of the impeachment
evidence assumes greater importance. A witness, even a criminal defendant,
id. , at H 40,894 (remarks of Rep. Dennis); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (language of Rule 609(a)(1) as enacted manifests an intent to shift the burden of persuasion
to the proponent). But see United States v. Vanderbosch, 610 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1979) (the
defendant required to show that the prejudicial effect of prior convictions outweighs their pro-
bative value).
203
	
United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025
(1976) (citing Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1029 (1968)) (centrality of the credibility issue as a major factor for the judge to consider).
204 See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, $ 316, at 327-28. See also Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
2°' See Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested
Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 931 (1980)
(courts have characterized crimes of physical violence as having little probative value on the issue
of credibility).
"6 FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(2); see supra text and note at note 198.
107 Surratt, supra note 205, at 933-35; see 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5
316, at 328-29.
2°8 FED. R. EV1D. 609(b). See infra text and notes at notes 249-51. The proponent must
also provide advance written notice to the adverse party. FED. R. EV1D. 609(b).
2°9
	
United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 275 (5th Cir. 1979).
210 Surratt, supra note 205, at 934 (the rehabilitation which the passage of time without a
conviction indicates is an important factor).
211 Id. at 939-40.
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should not be permitted falsely to imply that he has led a blameless life."'
Thus, in estimating the probative value of impeaching evidence, the court
should take into account the importance of the jury's decision on credibility to
the outcome of the case.
Thus, where a conviction is more than ten years old, there is an assump-
tion that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. That a con-
viction is less than ten years old does not, however, support the inverse
assumption, that probative value is not outweighed by prejudicial effect. In the
case of more recent convictions, the determination must take into account the
nature of the offense, the length of time since the conviction, the behavior of the
witness since the conviction, and the centrality of the credibility judgment to
the outcome of the case.
The element to be balanced against probative value in deciding ad-
missibility is "prejudicial effect to the defendant."'" The similarity of the
prior conviction to the offense charged is one possible source of such
prejudice,'" If the two offenses are the same or similar, it is much more likely
that the jury will consider the prior conviction as showing propensity to commit
the offense charged. Such an inference is impermissible."' In addition, prej-
udice may result from the effect of permitting impeachment upon the defend-
ant's decision to testify. If the defendant decides not to testify, the jury may be
denied the benefit of a full presentation of his case. Before the defendant makes
that decision, he should know the extent to which prior convictions will be ad-
missible to impeach his credibility. 216 These two examples are elaborations of
2'2
	 rule of evidence should not permit a witness to testify on behalf of a criminal
defendant with the appearance of an unblemished citizen, whereas in fact that witness has been
convicted of felonies." Hearings on Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. 5463 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974) (statement of Rep. Lawrence J. Hogan). See also 120
CONG. REC. S 37076 (daily ed. November 22, 1974):
Can it really be argued that the fact that a person has committed a serious crime — a
felony — has no bearing on whether he would be willing to lie to a jury?
Should a jury be denied that right? Should society be denied the opportunity, in
trying to protect itself, in its effort to discover the truth, to show that the witness
before it is a man who has committed such a crime and, therefore, might be willing
now to lie to a jury? I think not.
Id. (remarks of Senator McClellan). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, S 43, at 89.
213 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
214 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (a serious problem
arises when the prior conviction is for substantially the same crime as that of the present trial),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
215 383 F.2d at 940.
2 ' 6 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965), (citing MCCOR-
MICK, EVIDENCE S 43, at 94 (1st ed. 1954)) (defendant who is considering testifying may want to
know in advance the extent to which the trial judge will permit impeachment by a prior record).
The trial court's decision upon the admissibility of the prior conviction to impeach a witness who
is a defendant in a criminal case will very often affect the defendant's decision whether to testify.
United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1979) (en bane) (tactical choice to re-
main silent may be influenced by denial of motion in limine regarding prior convictions). See 31
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the basic understanding of prejudice, that is that the jury will conclude " 'if he
did it before he probably did so this time,' " 217 or that, "because he committed
a crime before, we will not feel so bad if we (even erroneously) convict him this
time. " 218 The possibility that the jury will reach either of these conclusions, if it
influences the defendant to choose not to testify, is prejudicial for that reason
alone. In effect, the court need not believe that the jury will actually draw one
of these conclusions in order to find that the prejudicial effect of the impeach-
ment outweighs its probative value. The mere fact that the defendant is
dissuaded from testifying since he or she believes the jury will draw those con-
clusions may render the evidence of prior convictions so prejudicial that it
should be excluded.
With respect to the criteria governing the allocation of burdens on the
question of admissibility, the policy articulated by Rule 609(a)(1) is clearly the
dominant consideration. Unlike Rule 403, which requires the opponent of
evidence to demonstrate that its probative value is "substantially outweighed"
by one (or more) of several named "dangers" or "considerations, " 219 Rule
609 strikes a different balance. By adopting this different balance, Congress in-
dicated its concern with the prejudicial effect of evidence of a prior conviction;
it also established a different allocation of burdens on the question of ad-
missibility. The allocation established by Congress requires the proponent to
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 609105], at 609-82 (opening statement of defense
counsel and decision as to whether the defendant takes the stand influenced by ruling on Rule
609); 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 315, at 317-18 (chilling effect of ruling on
the defendant's decision to take the stand). Therefore, a pretrial determination will be helpful, if
not required, in order for the defendant to make an informed decision. United States v. Oakes,
565 F.2d 170, 171-72 (1st Cir. 1977) (Generally, it is desirable to rule on the admissibility of prior
convictions in advance of the actual testimony.).
The admissibility of impeaching convictions cannot be decided in the abstract; if the
defendant seeks an advance ruling, he must at least indicate the substance of his testimony, so
that the court can assess the probative value o•the proposed impeachment. Id. (Balancing prob-
lems of the court are minimized if the judge knows about what the defendant is likely to testify.).
Some authority indicates that the defendant can establish (1) that he will testify if the proposed
impeachment is prohibited and (2) an outline of the nature of his testimony, through representa-
tions by his attorney. United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc). One
of the factors in the Luck balance is the importance of the defendant's testimony. Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.) (the more important the defend-
ant's testimony, the more carefully the judge may weigh the relevancy of the prior convictions to
credibility), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
If the testimony is important for the jury's consideration, then the trial court should not
permit the looming impeachment to chill the defendant into silence. To that extent, at least, the
opponent of the evidence bears some responsibility on the preliminary determination. Without
an advance ruling, if the defendant takes the chance of testifying, the trial judge, having heard
the testimony, knows its importance.
" 7 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d at 940.
21 $ See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 212 (1977)
(jurors will not have as great a regret in convicting an innocent man if he has committed crimes
in the past).
219 See supra text and notes at notes 118-30.
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prove that the probative value of the proffered evidence outweighs its prej-
udicial effect. 22° The legislative history indicates that these decisions were not
made haphazardly. 221
Concerns of fairness and efficiency are markedly less important, but
nonetheless they play some role. As is the case with questions arising under
Rule 404(b) ,222 it is fairer and more efficient to ask the proponent who seeks to
impeach with a prior conviction to demonstrate the importance of the impeach-
ment to the presentation of his case. Unlike the purpose of the other acts
evidence under Rule 404(b), impeachment is self-demonstrating: the credibili-
ty of a witness in the eyes of the jury is certain to be affected by their knowledge
of a prior conviction. Casting doubt on credibility, however, is often less cen-
tral to the resolution of the main issues in the case than is raising questions of
intent, motive or identity. Hence the prosecution or plaintiff is not as likely to
be harmed by a decision to exclude the testimony. For this reason, as well as
the great possibility of prejudice, Congress reversed the formula of Rule 403,
and deleted the modifier "substantially." 223
 Therefore, to have prior convic-
tions admitted for impeachment under Rule 609(a), the proponent has the
burden of proving that the probative value of impeaching credibility, in the
context of the specific case, outweighs the obvious prejudicial effect to the de-
fendant. Specifically, the proponent of evidence establishing a prior conviction
must show, if the prior conviction was for a felony that did not involve
dishonesty or false statement, 224
 that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Since prior offenses involving dishonesty or false statement have greater
probative value on the issue of credibility, Congress decided not to subject
those convictions to the balance against prejudicial effect. 225
 Whether such con-
victions are excludable by Rule 403 when their value is substantially out-
weighed by unfair prejudice is not clear, although most courts have held there
is no discretionary authority to prohibit their use. 225
220 See supra text and note at note 202.
201 See id.
222 See supra text and notes at notes 176-78.
225
	 Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., on Proposed Rules of Evidence,
Serial No. 2, 251-52 (1973) (statements of Judge Friendly, Mr. Hungate and Mr. Dennis)
(recognizing the possible prejudice and limited value on credibility of prior conviction impeach-
ment); 120 CONG. REC. 2379 (Feb. 6, 1974) (statement of Ms. Holtzman) (prior convictions
may be used to show motive or bias of a witness). See also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d
898, at 922 n.7 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (majority might try to argue that impeachment
evidence of a criminal defendant is less probative of guilt than evidence of an element such as in-
tent).
224
 The difficulty in determining what is a crime involving "dishonesty or false state-
ment" is clear from the floor debates in the House. 120 CONC. REC. 2376-80 (February 6, 1974)
(debate as to whether crimes like murder involve dishonesty).
225 See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 314, at 302 n.63 (the language in
609(a) "shall be admitted" rather than "may be received" overturns the discretionary approach
of Luck).
220 See, e.g. , United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir.) (court has no
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Since impeachment by a conviction which is embraced by Rule 609(a)(2)
is less restricted, and indeed perhaps an "absolute right," 227 the proponent
bears the burden of showing that the prior conviction involves dishonesty or
false statement. 228 That a conviction involves dishonesty or false statement may
be clear from the nature of the offense; few would gainsay the relevance of a
prior perjury conviction to the question of credibility. 229 The House and Senate
conferees mentioned subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud,
embezzlement and false pretenses as well.'" The core of the category is clear: if
an offense necessarily involves deception, then it is automatically admissible to
impeach. 2 " Other offenses may be committed in either a deceptive or a non-
deceptive manner, for example, petit larceny may "involve" dishonesty 2 s 2 or
false statement, 2 " or it may not. 234 The courts which have considered the ques-
tion have determined that the proponent must establish that the conviction fits
within the scope of 609(a)(2). For example, a prior conviction for importation
of cocaine is an offense "in the uncertain middle category — neither clearly
covered nor clearly excluded by the second prong test. " 295 In such cases, the
proponent must show either that the conviction for an offense was defined in
disCretion under FED. R. EVID. 403 to prohibit impeachment of a witness with a prior mail fraud
conviction), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980); United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th
Cir. 1977) (witness who has prior conviction for making false claims to the government is proper-
ly impeachable under FED. R. EVID. 609(a)); United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir.
1977) (distinction between FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) and 609(a)(2) is that the judge must admit
automatically evidence of prior conviction involving dishonesty or false statement while he has
discretion as to felony convictions after weighing probative value against prejudicial effect). But
cf. United States v, Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 n.4 (2d Cir.) ("It is an open question whether the
trial judge retains residual discretion under FED. R. EVID. 403 to exclude a conviction on
grounds of confusion, waste of time, or extreme prejudice: ") (citing United States v. Smith, 551
F.2d 348, 358 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (language of 609(a)(2) is absolute in nature, but it may be
abrogated by the language of Rule 403)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977). See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1609[04], at 609-70.
297 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1 609[04], at 609-70.
229 United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867
(1977).
229 Relevance is conventionally accepted, notwithstanding that it is the sheerest propen-
sity evidence, disfavored everywhere else in the law of evidence.
1" H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7051, 7103.
231
	 United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("only those
crimes characterized by deceit or deliberate interference with a court's ascertainment of truth").
232 The ambiguity of the term was foreseen. See ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON.
LAWRENCE,). HOGAN, H.R. REPT. NO. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-26 reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7051, 7094-96 (problems of defining dishonesty and false statement
in jurisdictions where crimen falsi are not statutorily defined).
293 See United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 845-48 (7th Cir. 1977) (theft conviction
alleging fraud and deceit admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) even though no underlying cir-
cumstances revealed).
23+ See United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (shoplifting con-
viction for which the underlying circumstances were not shown is not admissible).
235 United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d, 824, 827 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867
(1977).
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terms of deception, or that the circumstances of the offense indicated a decep-
tive propensity, and not mere 'stealth. ')236
If a prior conviction involves dishonesty or false statement, its probative
value on the issue of credibility is clear, assuming there is some validity to the
theory of propensity evidence. 237 A witness, having once before engaged in
deception, is more likely to do so again than a witness who has never before
deceived. Although such assumptions are open to question, particularly in
view of the generally dubious nature of propensity evidence, the theory is too
well entrenched to be discarded. 238 Thus the policy basis for allocating burdens
on admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2) is clear. The proponent must relate the
prior conviction to dishonesty or false statement; having done so, there may in-
deed be no other barrier to its use. The policy being so clear, fairness and effi-
ciency concerns are irrelevant to the placement of the burden.
In United States v. Crawford, 239 the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed a
ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of a prior conviction which might
have been admissible either under (a)(1) or (a)(2). 24° The court held, in disap-
proving the proceedings below after a prior remand, that while a formal hear-
ing is not always required, 24 ' "some inquiry into the nature and circumstances
of a prior conviction is a prerequisite to its admissibility. " 242 The burden of
proof is "clearly on the prosecution rather than the defendant," 243 but the
court continued in a cryptic footnote, "the critical objective is to get ap-
propriate information about the prior conviction before the trial judge. We
establish no rules about how that should be done." 244 The court may have been
implying that some burden of production rests upon the defendant to come for-
ward with information about the prior offense.
Although it is not clear, the basis for such a burden would appear to be
that the person convicted would have better access to information about the of-
fense. Even if that were true, it is difficult to qualify such an allocation of the
burden. The prosecution, normally the proponent in these disputes, certainly
has access to the information underlying the conviction. For example, in United
States v. Papia, 245 the government, seeking to impeach with a conviction for
236
1" FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee note.
2" See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 272-77
(1977).
239 613 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
240 Id. at 1049.
241 Id. at 1050. See United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.) (while a hear-
ing on the record is not required, it is strongly recommended since such a hearing allows an ap-
pellate court to determine whether the judge has followed Rule 609 in reaching his decision), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976).
742 613 F.2d at 1053.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1053 n.16. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, ¶ 609[05], at
609-85 n.11.
243 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
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misdemeanor theft, asserted that the conviction resulted from a plea agreement
on an original charge of forgery. 246 The trial court was affirmed in its reliance
upon that unchallenged representation in deciding to permit the impeachment
under Rule 609(a)(2). 247 The burden upon the proponent was not exceedingly
onerous, since there was no requirement to prove the underlying forgery
charge. 248 Clearly, when the prosecution seeks to impeach a witness with a con-
viction under 609(a)(2), there can be no justification for placing the burden on
the defendant, certainly not on the basis that, as the person convicted, he or she
will be better able to come forward with the evidence.
The remaining subsections of Rule 609 also raise questions about the
allocation of the burden of showing admissibility. Rule 609(b) specifically ad-
dresses the problem of convictions which are more than ten years old. 249 The
difference in language from paragraph (a) is significant. The "general rule" in
609(a) is that evidence of a prior conviction "shall be admitted ... only if" the
requirements of subdivisions (1) or (2) are met."° Rule 609(b) is couched in
terms of exclusion: evidence of a conviction more than ten years old "is not ad-
missible ... unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. " 25 ' As submitted by the Supreme
Court, the proposed rule banned absolutely the use of convictions more than
ten years old, provided there had been no more recent convictions." 2 The
House of Representatives completely prohibited the use of the older convic-
tions, regardless of more recent convictions, since "the probative value of the
conviction with respect to that person's credibility diminished to a point where
it should be no longer admissible." 2" The final formulation, which grants the
court discretion to permit the use of older convictions, was drafted in the
Senate Committee on the judiciary, which reported, "[i]t is intended that con-
victions over 10 years old will be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional
circumstances. "254
The balancing test in Rule 609(b) has been called the "mirror image of
the test under Rule 403."2" That characterization, however, is not quite cor-
246 Id. at 847.
242 Id. at 847-48.
245 ,Td.
245 FED. R. EVID. 609(b); see supra, text and note at note 208.
25° FED. R. EVID. 609(a); see supra text and notes at notes 202-06.
254 FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
"2 56 F.R.D. 183, 269-70 (1972) ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not ad-
missible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of the release of the witness
from confinement imposed for his most recent conviction, or the expiration of the period of his
parole, probation, or sentence granted or imposed with respect to his most recent conviction,
whichever is the later date.") See also D.C. CODE ENCYCL. S 14-305(b)(2)(B) (1970).
253 House Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. DOC.
NO. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 12 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7085.
254 S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, S.R. DOC. NO.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7062.
2" United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 277 n.18 (5th Cir. 1979).
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ma; the language of Rule 609(b) is more demanding. Not only must the pro-
bative value "substantially outweigh" prejudicial effect, but it also must be
supported by "specific facts and circumstances. "255 Clearly, the rule requires
that convictions more than ten years old must meet a high standard if they are
to be admissible to impeach a witness. The question remains whether the
burden of meeting this high standard necessarily falls on the proponent of the
evidence.
The probative value of a remote conviction is much lower than that of a
more recent conviction. The elements of prejudice, however, are not necessari-
ly diminished by the remoteness of the conviction. As the court stated in Mills
v. Estelle, 257
Obviously, prior crime evidence is prejudicial. First, a jury is bound to be
less reluctant to convict a person whom they know to have been convicted of
other crimes by other juries. Second, if used to impeach a defense witness,
prior crime evidence risks establishment of guilt by association. Third, if
used against a prosecution witness, prior crime evidence invites a jury im-
properly to weight testimony according to their perceptions of the relative
infamy associated with a particular crime."'"
The Mills court went on to say that the "implicit judgment" of Rule 609(b)
was that older convictions were generally more prejudicial than helpful on the
issue of credibility. 2 S 9 Furthermore, the court noted that the time limit "could
be conceptualized as a policy statement that if an offender keeps his record
unblemished for ten years, he will be presumed to be as truthful as a normal
citizen. " 26D The court added that the judgment on credibility is normative ("a
jury should not be influenced"), rather than descriptive."' Later cases have af-
firmed the Mills court's language, saying that "609(b) established a presump-
tion against the use of more than 10-year-old convictions. "262 Since a presump-
256 FED. R. EvID. 609(b). See United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 531 (4th Cir.
1978) ("since the power is to be exercised only in the 'rare' and 'exceptional' case, the District
Court is required under the Rule to support its finding with 'specific facts and circumstances.' "
(footnote omitted)). See also United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730, 734-36 (2d Cir. 1978) (re-
quiring finding on the record).
The court must also make its determination "in the interests of justice." One would
hope that the language is mere packaging, and that courts are not free to make determinations ig-
noring or violating those interests even if not specifically required by a rule. The Cathey court
used the "interests of justice" language to bolster its restrictive reading of Rule 609(b). 591 F.2d
at 275.
257
 552 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871 (1977).
2" 552 F.2d at 120.
2" Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. (emphasis in original).
262
 United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 275 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Mills v. Estelle,
supported the presumption against the use of more than 10-year-old convictions). See also United
States v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1150 (6th Cir. 1978) (Rule 609(b) creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that convictions over 10 years old are more prejudicial than probative); United States v.
Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 530 (4th Cir. 1978) (strict limits as to when a conviction more than 10
years old may be used).
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tion is a device for allocating the burden of proof,'" it is clear that the burden is
upon the proponent to justify admission under Rule 609(b).
Once again, the policy determinant is the most important basis for the
allocation of the burden to the proponent. The prejudicial impact upon the op-
ponent of impeachment is essentially the same as that of less remote convic-
tions. The probative value of older convictions, however, is very suspect. The
proponent of a remote conviction must therefore satisfy an exacting standard.
Fairness concerns also point in the same direction, since a witness, and the par-
ty offering him,'" will not expect impeachment with remote convictions, and
they will thus be less prepared to challenge its admissibility.
Rule 609(c) prevents some otherwise admissible convictions from being
introduced to impeach a witness.'" Its provisions create an additional question
of burden allocation. If a prior conviction, otherwise admissible under Rule
609, has been vitiated by a subsequent finding of rehabilitation, or a finding of
innocence, then under subsection (c), it is not admissible to impeach.'" The
burden to establish later findings which preclude impeachment is upon the op-
ponent of the evidence. The defendant in United States v. Wiggins267 opposed im-
peachment by a conviction for distribution of heroin, because, he asserted, his
release from a halfway house was equivalent to a finding of rehabilitation.'"
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the admission of the impeachment evidence because
the "release was not shown to be 'based on a finding of . . . rehabilita-
tion,' " 269 nor were the details of the program or the qualifications for
release demonstrated. 27° Clearly then, both the trial and appellate courts
looked to the opponent to establish the condition precedent to inadmissibility of
the evidence.
In United States v. Trejo-Zambrano,"' Trejo had previously been convicted
of a marijuana offense."' His conviction had been vacated under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 273 a procedure which would make it inadmissible under
Rule 609(c). 274 The prosecutor's copy of Trejo's record did not reflect the vaca-
fi3 Cleary, supra note 23, at 16-20 (presumptions as shifting the burdens of production
and persuasion).
264 Usually impeachment of a witness is done by the cross-examining party; thus the
party offering the witness will oppose impeachment. Under the Federal Rules, however, a party
may impeach his own witness. FED. R. EvID. 607. In that case, the opposing party may be
resisting impeachment.
265 FED. R. Evin. 609(c).
266 Id.
267 566 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1978).
268 Id. at 946. The appellant also sought a reversal on the basis of claimed error in bal-
ancing probative value and prejudice under Rule 609(a). Id.
"9 Id.
270 Id.
	27'
	
F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1978).
252 Id. at 464. The trial prosecutor was not certain whether the offense was possession or
smuggling. Id.
2 " 18 U.S.C. S 5021 (1967).
	27'
	 F.2d at 464.
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tion, and defense counsel had overlooked it when examining the docket in the
Clerk's Office. 275 The Ninth Circuit rejected Trejo's argument that Rule 609
required the prosecution to determine whether a prior conviction had been
vacated 276 The court held that the government had complied with the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 277 and that defense
counsel's misreading of the docket sheet did not impose any other duty upon
the prosecution. 278
Judge Kennedy dissented, opining that "it was error to admit evidence of
a Federal Youth Corrections Act conviction where the Government has not
shown that the conviction had not been expunged. " 279 Judge Kennedy's ap-
proach is the more defensible one in view of the fairness considerations that
govern in part the allocation of burdens on preliminary matters. The prosecu-
tion knew that FYCA convictions were subject to a certificate of discharge, and
simply had not verified the incomplete FBI "rap sheet." 28° Defense counsel
had raised the question, and indicated unfamiliarity with the subsequent
history of the prior conviction. 28 ' Particularly when the conviction is a federal
one, a federal prosecutor has greater access to subsequent records than does a
defense counse1. 282 Concerns of fairness, since they dictate that the party with
better access to the record should generally bear the burden, support the dis-
sent's analysis. The efficiency concern is a closer question. If the conviction
otherwise complies with Rule 609, a question disputed in Trejo-Zambrano, 2 "
then perhaps the opponent who seeks to rely upon a later event to render the
conviction unusable should bear the responsibility of establishing the later
event. Given the practicality of access to the information, this argument is
outweighed by concerns of fairness.
Rule 609(d) provides that an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is
"generally not admissible" to impeach a witness. If the court "is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt
or innocence," however, it may permit such impeachment of any witness other
than a criminal defendant". It is clear that the general rule is one of exclusion,
and the burden is upon the proponent to show the necessity for the impeach-
275 Id. at 465.
276 Id.
277 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(I)(B).
278 582 F.2d at 465.
278 Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2" Id.
261
252 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(B) advisory committee note ("A defendant may be
uncertain of the precise nature of his prior record and it seems therefore in the interest of efficien-
cy and fair administration to make it possible to resolve prior to trial any disputes as to the cor-
rectness of the relevant criminal record of the defendant.").
2" See 582 F.2d at 465-66.
2" FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
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ment. 285 In United States v. Decker, 286 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of
impeachment by a juvenile adjudication, since "[a]ppellants proffered no
evidence concerning the adjudication. "287 The policy protecting juveniles from
collateral consequences of delinquency adjudications is a powerful one, and
should yield only in the most compelling circumstances.'" Once again,
fairness and efficiency are secondary concerns.
In summary, Rule 609, despite its tortuous development, is a valuable ex-
ample of explicit policy choices, and their procedural consequences. Congress
in adopting the rule limited impeachment, articulated standards for its use,
and allocated burdens on admissibility to achieve its goals. A conviction
relating to deception is considered very probative, and, once its nature is
shown, it is virtually impossible to exclude. Other convictions vary in their pro-
bative value and prejudicial effect so, when the impeachment is of a criminal
defendant or defense witness, the proponent must justify their use. Prosecution
witnesses and witnesses in civil cases are less protected. There, the opponent of
impeachment must justify exclusion under Rule 403. Older convictions and
juvenile adjudications are only rarely to be used, thus, the proponent must
meet more exacting tests. If the probative value of a usable conviction is under-
cut by later rehabilitation, or finding of innocence, it is normally the
opponent's burden to prove the later event. In sum, the allocations of the
burden have generally advanced the policies articulated in the various provi-
sions of Rule 609.
4. Hearsay and its Exceptions
a. Rule 801(a)
Unlike Rules 403, 404(b) and 609, the Rules governing the definition of
hearsay and its exceptions do not involve a balance of probative value and prej-
udice. The application of the hearsay rules is one which requires an analysis of
the elements of a definition and a determination whether proffered evidence
meets the terms of the definition. The general policy of the Federal Rules is
that relevant evidence is admissible, unless excluded by another rule. 299 The
hearsay exclusion articulated in Rule 802 is the prime example of a rule of in-
admissibility. "Hearsay is, of course, a prolific breeder of questions as to ad-
missibility." 2" The drafters of the Federal Rules tackled the thankless task of
285 Id. The offense which is the basis of the adjudication must also be one which would
be admissible were it a criminal conviction. Id.
288 543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977).
887 Id. at 1104.
288 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-20 (1974) (confrontation clause requires the
permitting of bias impeachment, if critical to issue of credibility).
289 FED. R. EVID. 402; see supra text and notes at notes 104 and 115.
290 10 J. MOORE, MOORE'S....-PNTIERAL PRACTICE, S 104.13 [5], at 1-54 n.4 (2d ed.
1982).
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codifying the rule against hearsay evidence and its exceptions. 29 ' The very first
sentence of their formulation, defining "statement," raises many questions
about the allocation of burdens on preliminary questions. "A 'statement' is (1)
an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is in-
tended by him as an assertion." 292 The Advisory Committee's accompanying
note highlights one problem, the determination whether an assertion is in-
tended. 299 The Committee indicated that by their wording, they intended to
impose the burden of proving that an assertion was intended upon the party
claiming that an assertion was made. 294 So, when evidence of conduct is of-
fered, there must be a preliminary finding on the issue whether it was intended
as an assertion. The proponent must "indicate the conduct he intends to prove
and the inference he intends to draw. " 29S Then, if the opponent makes a hear-
say objection that the conduct was assertive and that it is offered to prove the
truth of the matter, 296 the judge must rule on the objection. He must decide
whether the proffered conduct was intended as an assertion of the matter
sought to be proven. The burden of showing such an assertion was intended is
upon the objector.
A classic situation in which these issues arise is that of a defendant offering
evidence that someone else fled the scene of a crime. If the third party was in-
tentionally seeking to draw suspicion to himself, the proffered evidence is inad-
missible hearsay. According to Professor Maguire, "Nile prosecutor should
have the burden of establishing that claim. " 297 Judge Weinstein agrees, saying
that "casting the burden of proving an assertion on the objector seeks to make
relevant evidence ... more readily available to the trier of fact."'"
The reasoning which supports this assignment of the burden of persuasion
reflects the policy of a permissive attitude toward admissibility of relevant
evidence, 299
 as well as a judgment that non-assertive conduct should not be ex-
' 9 ' See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. Ser. No. 2, 252 (1973) ("It
[hearsay] seems to be about the last subject in the world I would try to codify.") (statement of
Judge Friendly).
292 FED, R. EvID. 801(a).
295 FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committe note.
When evidence of conduct is offered•on the theory that it is not a statement, and
hence not hearsay, a preliminary determination will be required to determine
whether an assertion is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden upon
the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be
resolved against him and in favor of admissibility.
Id.
294 Id.
295 4 J,WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 801(a)1021, at 801-62.
296 See FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
297
	 The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741,
766 (1961). The basis for Professor Maguire's conclusion is that jurors, with the aid of opposing
counsel, will be able to assess that claim, and the evidence should not be kept from them, unless
of course, the judge has decided that it is assertive conduct. Id. at 767.
298 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, T 801(a)[02], at 801-63.
299 Id. at 801-60 (close cases should be decided in favor of admissibility).
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eluded as hearsay, because it does not present the problems of out-of-court
assertions. 30° Professor Maguire concurred with the former view: "relevant
evidence is acceptable unless barred ... [;] the proper normal course must be to
put on objecting parties the burden of establishing, in debatable cases, the in-
tention [to assert] . . . . " 3°' He conceded that this approach has not been em-
braced by the courts, 902 but he argued that assessing reliability in these cases is
well within the ability of the jury. 303 Therefore, he concluded, except where the
case is clearly made against it, the evidence and the decision ought to be given
to them. 304
Once again, the policy consideration is predominant in the allocation of
burdens. The implications of fairness and efficiency are difficult to work out in
the abstract, since neither party may have access to information about the
motivation of the person whose conduct is in question. If the logical order of
presentation is important, it would seem that the reason for the person's con-
duct is an integral part of the process of proof, and therefore the burden should
be the proponent's. The policy reasoning, increasingly liberal admission of
evidence which might be hearsay, however, places the responsibility to show
that an assertion was in fact intended, upon the opponent.
b. Exceptions — Admissible Hearsay
Less esoteric questions arise much more frequently over the applicability
of a hearsay exception. The traditional position is that the proponent of hearsay
evidence bears the burden of satisfying the judge that the proffered evidence
fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. 303 The codification of exceptions to
the ban on hearsay and of the exceptions to the exceptions, however, has
revealed that the allocation of burdens is not as simple as it once seemed.
Clearly the proponent of hearsay evidence must establish each of the elements
of the argued-for exception. Even if the proffered evidence meets the basic re-
quirements of an exception, the opponent of the evidence might assert that the
evidence falls within an exception to the exception. 306 The burden is upon the
'°° But see 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 414, at 85-87 (non-assertive
conduct gives rise to four risks which are related to hearsay: (1) misperception; (2) flawed
memory; (3) ambiguity; and (4) since the determination as to whether conduct is assertive is dif-
ficult, if the court errs by admitting assertive conduct, the jury may be misled).
30 ' Maguire, supra note 297, at 766.
302 Id. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1242
(E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[P]roponents of diary entries bear the burden of establishing that they are
assertions.... In the absence of such a foundation, the entries cannot qualify as admissions
under 801(d)(2).").
3° 3 Maguire, supra note 297, at 762.
"4 Id. (Since no specialized intelligence is required to determine whether conduct is
non-assertive, such a determination should be left to the jury.).
3° 5 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 35, at 258. See also CAL. EVID. CODE
$ 405 comment (West 1966).
906 See, e.g. , FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (statements of memory or belief used to prove the fact
remembered or believed are not admissible unless they relate to declarant's will); FED. R. EVID.
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opponent to establish that, notwithstanding the satisfaction of the basic re-
quirements, the evidence is inadmissible. The approach is the familiar confes-
sion and avoidance of the common law."'
(i) Admissions
When a party offers an out-of-court statement which is in some way at-
tributable to his opponent — an admission — it will not be excluded by the
hearsay prohibition. 3 p 9
 At common law, admissions are considered an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, but the Federal Rules of Evidence treat admissions as
excluded from the definition of hearsay since their admissibility is not depend-
ent upon circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 309
 Rule 801(d)(2) lists
five kinds of statements which are classified as admissions. 3 '° Whether admis-
sions are hearsay exceptions or exclusions, the burden of showing admissibility
is upon the proponent of the statement. 3 "
The category of admissions which has been subject to the most judicial
and academic attention is that of statements by a co-conspirator of a party. 3 ' 2
The elements which must be established for such a statement to be admitted
were listed by the Eighth Circuit in United Slates v. Be11: 3 " "[l]t is well-
803(6)-(8) (records inadmissible if source of information, or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness); FED. R. EvID. 804(a) (declarant is not unavailable
if the proponent of the evidence wrongly induced or procured his absence); FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(3) (statements against interest offered to exculpate accused inadmissible unless corrobora-
tion indicates their trustworthiness).
3°7
 Cleary, supra note 23, at 8 & n.8. See also G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 521 (1978); J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 326 (1981)
[A] defendant who did not traverse the declaration might admit the facts to be true
and allege new facts which avoided the legal effect of the original facts. This was
called a plea by way of confession and avoidance. Note that two elements were necessary
for a proper plea by way of confession and avoidance — defendant had to admit or
confess the declaration and then allege additional matters which avoided the ap-
parent right of plaintiff.
Id. (emphasis in original); J. MCKELVEY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 102-24
(1917).
3°8
 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, S 262.
3°9 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note.
31°
 The basic categories of admissions are (1) personal, (2) adoptive, (3) authorized, (4)
agency, and (5) co-conspirator. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
3 " The affectation of the drafters in categorizing admissions as non-hearsay rather than
as an exception to the exclusionary rule does not affect the burden of allocation or the identity of
the decisionmaker. CI 4 D. LOU1SELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 427, at 368.
[T]o say that such a [co-conspirator's] statement is not hearsay, and therefore not
subject to the technical evidentiary concerns which underlie the hearsay doctrine,
simply will not do. Of course Rule 801(d)(2) instructs us that such statements are
not hearsay,' but this magical transmutation does not alter the fact that such
statements, when offered for their truth, do fit the hearsay definition set forth in
Rule 801(c), and emphatically do give rise to all of the concerns which have tradi-
tionally underlain the hearsay doctrine."
Id.
312
 See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 801(d)(2)(E)[01].
313
 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978).
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established that an out-of-court declaration of a co-conspirator is admissible
against a defendant if the government [proponent] demonstrates (1) that a con-
spiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and the declarant were members of the
conspiracy; and (3) that the declaration was made during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. "S 14 The policy of hearsay exclusion is predomi-
nant, and an exception to that policy must be justified by the party relying
upon it. 31 '
As is the case with many other preliminary questions of fact, one of the
most disputed procedural issues when a party attempts to introduce an admis-
sion is whether the decision on preliminary facts must be made by the judge or
by the jury. 3 t 6 The trend among the circuits with respect to co-conspirator
declarations has been that the decision is one for the trial judge under Rule
104(a). 317 The possibility of jury misuse of co-conspirator statements is so great
that the trend is clearly correct. 3 " Those who assert that the preliminary ques-
tion is one for the jury view the question as one of conditional relevancy rather
than purely of admissibility. 319 So viewed, the case is even stronger for placing
the burden of justifying admission upon the proponent. To do so is consistent
with the practice under Rules 401 and 104(b), relating to relevancy. 32°
Certainly if a statement were proffered on the basis that it was a statement
by a person authorized by an adverse party 32 ' or a statement by the agent of a
party, 322
 the existence of facts which would warrant attribution is a decision
that, under Rule 104(a), must be made by the judge."' There is simply too
great a danger that the jury will ignore the preliminary requirements of finding
authorization or agency and proceed to consider the statement as substantive
"4 Id. at 1043.
3" See supra text and note at note 305.
316 See note 9, supra; 4 D. LOU1SELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 424, at 293-95.
3" See, e.g. , United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22-23
(1st Cir. 1977). See also 1 D. LOU1SELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 29, n.4.1 (Supp. 1980)
(post-Rule cases in which the responsibility for preliminary matters rests exclusively with the
judge). But see Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigation: Putting the
Conspiracy Back into the Coconspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 94-95 (1976) (Since the
independent-proof-of-preliminary facts requirement of the co-conspirator rule provides strict
guidelines for the trier of fact, it is inappropriate for the judge to make a preliminary determina-
tion.); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 53, at 123-24 & 124 n.97.
318 See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 427, at 370-71 n.7 (The mental
acrobatics required to separate the preliminary question of admissibility from the ultimate ques-
tion of guilt and the fact that the statement itself asserts the fact upon which its admissibility is
based makes the judge the proper party to determine whether the alleged co-conspirator's out of
court statement is admissible.).
319 See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 427, at 367-68.
32° See supra text and notes at notes 108-10.
321 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
322 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
323 See 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 29, at 207-08 (The best approach
is for the judge to make an independent fording as to the existence of the preliminary fact that the
party-opponent authorized the statement or that it was made by its agent.).
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evidence. The danger of such misuse is even greater in the case of co-
conspirator declarations. 324
 This danger, however, is not so great if the dispute
concerns the identity of the declarant or the adoption of a statement by a party.
If the party did not make or adopt the statement, it will in many cases be irrele-
vant, and the jury can often be trusted to ignore irrelevancies."' Thus, in most
of the categories of admissions listed in Rule 801(d)(2), the decision as to
preliminary facts should clearly be made by the judge. Where a statement is
purportedly an admission because adopted by a party, however, it may well be
the decision as to preliminary facts (i.e., was it in fact adopted?) should be left
to the jury.
With respect to the admissibility of adoptive admissions, codified in Rule
801(d)(2)(B), Dean Wigmore wrote:
It would seem to be better to rule at least that any statement made in the par-
ty's presence and hearing is receivable, unless he can show that he lacked
either the opportunity or the motive to deny its correctness; thus placing
upon the opponent of the evidence the burden of showing to the judge its im-
propriety. But the burden is in practice generally left upon the proponent to
show that the requisite conditions existed; though the middle course is
sometimes taken of leaving the question to the jury. 3"
Thus there is a relationship between the allocation of the burden on ad-
missibility and the question of assigning the decision to the judge or to the jury.
Essentially, Dean Wigmore wanted the jury to hear the statement, if it were
"made in the party's presence or hearing."'" So, he asserted that the burden
should be upon the opponent to show lack of "opportunity or motive to deny its
correctness. "328
 It could be that in the normal course of events, a person would
be expected to contradict a statement, and therefore, it is fairer and more effi-
cient to ask that person to explain how this situation was not a normal one.
Wigmore conceded that his position was not consistent with the case law, but
he was placated because the same objective was often furthered by assigning
the issue to the jury."' Skeptics of the ability of juries to separate the two
distinct issues and to refuse to consider a statement substantively unless they
found it to have been adopted would argue that leaving the question to the jury
undercuts the requirements of the exception if not the prohibition on hearsay
323 See supra note 318.
325 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, $ 53, at 125.
926 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, $ 1071, at 106 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted). See United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1975)
(trial judge must in the case of admission by silence control the determination of preliminary
facts), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
327
 4J. WIGMORE, supra note 1 $ 1071, at 106 & n.2 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). See, e.g.,
United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1195-96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
328 4 J. WIGMORE, Supra note 1 $ 1071, at 106 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
329 Id.
"° FED R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) & (C) raise FED. R. EVID. 104(a) issues. 4 D. LOUISELL
& C. MUELLER, supra note 9, $ 424, at 292-294 (the risk of misuse requires that the judge deter-
mine the question of admissibility under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (B)). See also Arpan v. United
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One case in which the division of function between judge and jury was ex-
tremely significant to the burden allocation was O'Neal v. Morgan."' O'Neal
sued four New York City police officers seeking damages for the violation of
her deceased husband's civil rights. 332 At trial she sought to introduce evidence
of an admission allegedly made by one of two defendants, but she could not
identify which one." 3 The trial court excluded the evidence on the ground that .
it was not properly authenticated. 334 Reversing, the Second Circuit held that
the statement should be revealed to the jury, because it found that the cir-
cumstances were sufficient to support a finding that the declarant was one of
the defendants. 335 The court further held that each defendant would hear "the
burden of persuading the jury that the admission was not made by him. "336
The Court analogized to principles of res ipsa loquitur." 7 A quasi-dissent is
registered by the author of the opinion in a concluding footnote which ex-
presses a preference for a resolution of the dispute pursuant to Rule 104(a), and
insightfully suggests that the issue is really one of vicarious admission im-
putable to all four defendants. 338
The court's position results in an anomaly. if the question is labeled as
one relating to hearsay, then the burden of showing admissibility should be
upon the proponent, and the decision should be one for the judge under Rule
104(a)."9 On the other hand, if the question is viewed as one of authentication,
then under Rule 901(a), the evidence should be given to the jury if there is suf-
ficient evidence to support a finding that it is what it is purported to be. 34° Even
States, 260 F.2d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 1958) (whether the circumstances of the making of a state-
ment by a third party are such that would call for a prompt reply from the accused is for the judge
to determine).
3 " 637 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1980).
"2 Id. at 847. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1976). Id. at 847.
"3 637 F.2d at 849-51.
"4 Id. at 850.
3" Id. at 850-51.
"6 Id. at 851.
997 "We find the analogies sufficiently helpful to rely upon them at least for the limited
purpose of developing a procedure for placing an admission in evidence in a multi-defendant civil
trial." Id.
338 637 F.2d at 853 n.8 (Newman, J.).
"9 See supra note 330. Bid cf. CAL. EVID. CODE 403(a)(4) (West 1966) (The proponent
of the evidence has the burden of production as to the preliminary fact and the evidence is inad-
missible unless the court finds there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the preliminary
fact when the proffered evidence is a statement or conduct of a person and the preliminary fact is
whether that person made the statement or so conducted himself.).
3" See FED. R. EVID. 90I(a) & advisory committee note. If the preliminary question is
to be resolved under FED. R. EVID. 104(b), or its counterpart, FED. R. EVID. 901, then the pro-
ponent must adduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the evidence is what it is pur-
ported to be. The result in O'Neal is explicable since there may be sufficient evidence to support
findings that the admission was made by either of two defendants. The problem is that the jury
will use the admission against all the defendants and the justification for assigning the decision to
them rests on the theory that it is admissible only against one of them. The jury should be able to
consider the statement against more than one defendant only if it is admitted as an authorized or
agency admission, in which case the decision on admissibility is made under Rule 104(a). See
supra note 338.
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if the evidence goes to the jury, the proponent should still bear the burden of
persuasion on the question of authentication.
O'Neal v. Morgan illustrates the influence of fairness and efficiency con-
cerns upon the allocation of burdens. The court's decision, that each defendant
bore the burden of detaching himself from the statement,'" illustrates a rough
fairness. Certainly the defendant who made the statement has more access to
information on the disputed question than the plaintiff, and it is not unfair to
cast the burden on him. The defendant who did not make the statement,
however, does not have that "advantage," and therefore faces a difficult, if not
impossible task. If the plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to justify a
finding that either defendant made the statement, then it may well be that it is
more efficient to place the burden of persuasion on the opponent, who denies
having made the admission. Therefore, although the policy concern of hearsay
exclusion would lead to an assignment of the burden to the proponent of the
statement, the O'Neal court was influenced by unacknowledged estimates of
fairness and efficiency to reverse that allocation. Generally, for a statement to
be established as an admission, the preliminary facts must be established by the
proponent of the evidence. In most instances, the determination of these
preliminary facts is to be made by the trial judge rather than by the jury, since
juries may tend to treat the statement as substantive evidence before its admis-
sibility is established. This rationale, however, may be less compelling in the
case of adoptive admissions, and such determinations, therefore, should be
made by juries. Finally, although policy generally mandates that the proponent
show a given statement is an admission and therefore not hearsay, fairness and
efficiency sometimes dictate that the burden be reversed and allocated to the
opponent of the evidence.
(ii) The Records Exceptions: Rules 803(6), (7), (8)
The exception to the hearsay rule which has one of the longest pedigrees is
the business records exception." 2 Business records generally satisfy the two
underlying principles governing hearsay exceptions: necessity and relia-
bility."' Except for the part of Rule 803(6) which broadens the scope of records
that are admissible under the exception,'" the Federal Rules adopt an or-
thodox statement of the exception."' The record must be one of a "regularly
"I See supra text and note at note 336.
342 Sec 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1 5 1518 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
34' See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1 5 1420, at 251-52 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
74 "A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses...." FED. R. EVID. 803(6). See also id. advisory committee
note.
"5 See id. (follows the widely accepted Commonwealth Fund Act [in E. MORGAN et al. ,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 63 (1927)] and the UNIF. BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT, 9A
U.L.A. 504 [1965].).
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conducted business activity;" it must be "a regular practice of that business"
to keep the record; the record must be based upon personal knowledge; and it
must be made "at or near the time" of the event recorded. 346 These prereq-
uisites must be shown by the testimony "of the custodian or other qualified
witness. " 547 The wording of the exception clearly places the burden upon the
proponent of the evidence. Reliance on the wording led the Tenth Circuit, in
Vesper Construction Co. v. Rain for Rent, Inc. 348 to affirm the exclusion of proffered
records because, although the records 349 had been prepared at the plaintiff's re-
quest, they were offered by the defendant without his having established the
proper foundation. 35° The proponent of the evidence must show that it is a
business record which meets the requirements of the exception, if it is to be ad-
mitted.
Not only does the statement of the exception strongly imply that the
burden is upon the proponent, but also that allocation is supported by policy,
fairness, and efficiency. Since there is a general policy of exclusion of hearsay
evidence, subject to particular exceptions, a proponent of hearsay must
therefore escape the general prohibition by complying with a specific excep-
tion. Except in unusual cases, like Vesper, where the proponent initiated the
preparation of the records, the proponent will have greater access to informa-
tion about the circumstances of the origin and custody of the record, and
therefore it is both fairer and more efficient to ask him to present it. Efficiency
also is served by having the source of the record presented as a logical part of its
introduction.
Satisfying the four essential prerequisites which qualify the evidence as a
business record, however, will not guarantee admissibility, since Rule 803(6)
provides only that such records are not excluded by the hearsay rule "unless
the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation in-
dicate lack of trustworthiness." 351 The other records exceptions, Rules 803(7) -
and (8), also expressly included the reference to trustworthiness in the rules as
submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court."' In adopting this proviso
146 FED. R. EVID. 803(6). See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 446, at
650-62.
"7 Fan. R. Evil:). 803(6).
i48 602 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1979).
3{8 Id. at 242.
"° Id,
' 5 ' FED. R. Evil). 803(6).
352 FED. R. EVID. 803(6) and (8) were so qualified in the initial draft. 46 F.R.D. 161,
346, 347 (1969). In order to conform the exception for absence of entry, the drafters added the
proviso to FED. R. EVID. 803(7) in 1971. See 51 F.R.D. 315, 420 (1971). There is some doubt
whether the trustworthiness proviso applies to all three clauses of FED. R. EVID. 803(8); both the
Rule and the Advisory Committee Notes are unclear. The Uniform Rules and state adaptations
of the Federal Rules have been more precise. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. ANN. RULES OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 803(8) 1977 ("[u]nless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness, records ... setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law ... , or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings ..." [emphasis added]); ARK. STAT. ANN. S
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granting discretion to the courts to exclude untrustworthy business records, the
Advisory Committee indicated that it was wary of situations such as that in
Palmer v. Hoffman, where the business record at issue was based upon informa-
tion provided by someone who may not have had a motive to be accurate. 353
The Committee concluded that the lack of a motivation to be accurate would
cast doubt on the reliability of the business record, thereby undercutting the
justification for the exception to the hearsay rule. 354
 The Advisory Committee
correctly declined to focus inquiry on the existence of a motivation to be accu-
rate; rather, it drafted the rule so that the broader question of trustworthiness
would be the crucial concern. 355
 In doing so, the Committee incorporated other
factors into the decision on admissibility, such as the record's timeliness and
the qualifications of the source of the information. 356
Despite the breadth of this exception to the business records exception , 357
it is clear that the policy of the rule will limit the instances in which business
records will be deemed untrustworthy. Judge Weinstein, in examining the
policies underlying the trustworthiness provision, concluded that based on
Rules 401 and 102, "as a general matter the rules favor making all relevant
evidence available to the trier of fact. "358
 After discussing other sources of un-
trustworthiness, 959
 he states that "[t]he record, once admitted [into evidence]
as reliable under 803(6) may, of course, be deemed so trustworthy as to enjoy a
presumption. "36o
 Although it is not entirely clear, he seems to say that a record
which has satisfied the basic requirements of the exception is presumptively
trustworthy, so that establishing the applicability of the excluding proviso is the
responsibility of the opponent."' In another part of his discussion, Judge
Weinstein analogizes the proviso to Rule 403, and suggests that a similar
analysis should govern the decision on admissibility. 362 If that is an apt
28.1001, Rule 803(8) (1979); ("The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule:
(v) any matter as to which the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness."). Courts as well as commentators have concluded that the proviso does apply
to all three clauses. See United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1979) (trustwor-
thiness of records established by showing that custom agents had no motive to fabricate entries
into a computer along with the trustworthiness of computers themselves), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1049 (1978); 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 456, at 764-66.
" 3 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943). See Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir.
1942).
334 FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee note.
335 Id.; 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, $ 447, at 672.
336 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee note.
" 7
 Certainly, an application of Rule 11 of the Model Code of Evidence would lead to the
conclusion that the opponent must show lack of trustworthiness, since the wording of the proviso
begins with the word "unless." See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 11 at notes 68 to 71, supra
and accompanying text.
"8 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, i 803(6)[07], at 803-177.
359
 See id., at 803-179 (type of record, the manner of entry or keeping, or the qualifica-
tions of the entrant).
366 Id.
36' See Cleary, supra note 23, at 16-20.
362 4 1 WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, ¶ 806(6)[07], at 803-178.
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analogy, then the burden should be placed upon the opponent to justify exclu-
sion of the evidence on the ground that it is untrustworthy.
Often, an objection that the proffered evidence lacks trustworthiness can
be read as an invocation of the court's discretionary power to exclude evidence
under Rule 403 as well as a claim that the requirements of the exception to the
exclusion of hearsay are not met. In Melville v. American Home Assurance Co. , 363
the Third Circuit reviewed a trial court ruling admitting two Federal Aviation
Administration Airworthiness Directives.'" The trial court had held that the
directives were "factual findings" which were subject to Rule 803(8)(C), 365
and that, as public records "based on legal duty and authority, [they]
contain[ed] sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to justify
their use at trial." 366 The defendants in this aircrash litigation were contending
that the Directives depended upon the expertise of the agency for their reliábili-
ty, and, as such, were expert opinions of persons whose qualifications could not
properly be tested. 367 In view of the liberalization of the Federal Rules with
respect to expert testimony, the court rejected this argument, preferring to har-
monize the hearsay exception with Rules 702 and 705, relating to the bases for
expert testimony.'"
The trial court noted that satisfaction of the basic requirements of Rule
803(8) raises "presumption[s] of reliability" which may be rebutted with
evidence of untrustworthiness. 369 The trial court noted that a specific challenge
to the F.A.A.'s expertise might have been appropriate as evidence of un-
trustworthiness. 370
 The opponent's contention that official records containing
expert opinion should never be accepted unless the declarant is present and his
expertise subject to challenge, however, was rejected by the court."' The court
of appeals agreed, noting first that the rules relating to expert evidence "pro-
vide a means of testing ... [the] reliability" of official reports proffered pur-
suant to Rule 803(8)." 2
Before these objections may be recognized, however, the party challenging
the validity of an official report admitted under 803(8)(C) must come for-
ward with some evidence which would impugn its trustworthiness. ... To
allow objections to be sustained under Rules 702 and 705 without a showing
of untrustworthiness would have the practical effect of nullifying the excep-
tion to the hearsay rule provided by rule 803(8)(C)." 3
363 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'g 443 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
364 An Airworthiness Directive is an FAA-issued description of unsafe conditions in
some products, which are likely to exist or may develop in other products of the same design. 443
F. Supp. at 1110 n.69. See also 14 C.F.R. $ 39.1 (1981).
365 See FED. R. Evin. 803(8)(C).
366 Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064, 1112 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (Becker, J.), reo'd on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
367 443 F. Supp. at 1113.
366 584 F.2d at 1316.
369 443 F. Supp. at 1112.
'7° Id, at 1113-14.
3" Id.
" 2 584 F.2d at 1316; see FED. R. EvID. 702 & 705.
"3 584 F.2d at 1316 (citations omitted).
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The Court concluded by commenting that, with respect to the particular facts
before it: "We note that no evidence of untrustworthiness appears in the
record." 3"
The Court's language is imprecise. To say that the opponent "must come
forward with some evidence," if interpreted literally, is not to say that the op-
ponent bears the burden of persuasion. The language implies only an alloca-
tion of a burden of production. 375 Nevertheless, it is quite likely that the Court
was assigning the burden of persuasion, especially since it noted in the follow-
ing sentence that a showing of unreliability was necessary. Other courts have
not distinguished between the burdens in this context, and they uniformly
place them both upon the opponent. 376 Thus, the proponent of a business or
government record must establish the preliminary facts to show that the prof-
fered evidence meets the requirements of the exception. The fact that evidence
complies with the exception creates a presumption that is trustworthy. So, it is
incumbent upon the opponent to show that the presumption is incorrect.
When the trustworthiness proviso is invoked, the underlying policy man-
dates that the opponent of the evidence bear the burden of demonstrating inad-
missibility. Once the proponent has complied with the basic requirements of an
exception, he has satisfied the basic policy of the hearsay rule. Only in an
unusual case will such evidence then be untrustworthy."' Therefore, the oppo-
nent should be the party obligated to show that this is an unusual case. 378 Ac-
cess to information, which is the determinant of fairness, however, points in the
other direction. In demonstrating the applicability of the business records ex-
ception, the proponent has the initial burden, in part because he normally has
greater access to information pertaining to the required elements of a business
record. When the issue involves trustworthiness, it is no less clear that the pro-
ponent of the evidence maintains such greater access. Access to the information
on the disputed point also is an element of efficiency, but efficiency also in-
374 Id. at n.16.
375 If satisfaction of the basic elements of the exception raises a "presumption" of
reliability, then, under the Federal Rules, only the burden of production will be affected. See
FED. R. EvID. 301 (presumption does not shift the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion).
"6 See Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978) (opponent of a
police accident report bears the burden of proving its lack of trustworthiness), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (opponents
of copyright certificates offered to show the date of fixation did not offer proof of their lack of
trustworthiness and therefore did not meet their burden), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
377 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee note. "Consequently the rule proceeds
from the base that records made in the course of a regularly conducted activity will be taken as
admissible but subject to authority to exclude if 'the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.' " Id.
3" Another factor relevant to the allocation is convenience — the natural order of
storytelling — which argues against placing the burden on the opponent because the proponent's
presentation of its case is disrupted. This is outweighed, however, by the substantial waste of
time that would be an inevitable result of requiring the proponent to prove that each document is
trustworthy.
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cludes a probability estimation, which, because untrustworthy business records
are thought to be unusual, would lead to placing the burden upon the oppo-
nent. Despite the proponent's greater access to information, therefore, the
burden of proving untrustworthiness is cast upon the opponent for reasons of
both policy and efficiency.
(iii) Rule 804
(A) Unavailability
Several exeptions to the hearsay rule have historically been conditioned upon
the unavailability of the declarant. 379 The Federal Rules follow that tradition
and improve upon it, by defining unavailability uniformly for the entire class of
exceptions, instead of applying varying definitions for each exception as the
common law authorities had done. 3 " Rule 804(a) defines unavailability as in-
cluding (1) a valid claim of privilege; (2) persisent refusal to testify; (3) lack of
memory; (4) death or illness; and (5) absence beyond process or reasonable
reach. 38 ' Rule 804(b) then indicates the types of evidence that are not ex-
cludable by the hearsay rule "if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. „382
The wording clearly implies that the proponent of evidence as an exception
under Rule 804(b) bears the burden of showing unavailability under Rule
804(a), and the courts have consistently followed the implication.'”
In United States v. Pelton, 384 defense counsel sought to introduce grand jury
testimony, representing to the court that the attorney for the grand jury witness
"9 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 253, at 608.	 •
380 See id. (determination of what satisfies the requirement of unavailability defined in
connection with each of the exceptions has little to commend it).
381 FED. R. EVID. 804(a). After illustrating kinds of unavailability, Rule 804(a) con-
cludes: "A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of hii
statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying." Id. There has
been little consideration of what constitutes "procurement or wrongdoing," and none on the
allocation of burdens on this question. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 486, at
1068-74. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE 5 405, comment, Assembly Committee on Judiciary (West
1966):
Under this code, the proponent of a hearsay declaration has the burden of proof on
the unavailability of the declarant as a witness ...; but the party objecting to the
evidence has the burden of proving that the unavailability of the declarant was pro-
cured by the proponent in order to prevent the declarant from testifying.
Id.
382 FED. R. EVID, 804(b).
583 See 11 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE I 804.02, at VIII-239 (2d ed.
1982). See also United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prosecution had
burden of demonstrating that a witness was unavailable before her preliminary hearing
testimony could be admitted); People v. Enriquez, 19 Cal. 3d 221, 235, 561 P.2d 261, 270, 137
Cal. Rptr. 171, 180 (1977) (burden of proof as to unavailability is on the proponent of the
evidence). See also 5 J. W1GMORE, supra note 1, 5 1414, at 237-38 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
384 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978).
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" 'indicated that he [would] advise her to invoke her privilege under the Fifth
Amendment and refuse to testify' " at the subsequent trial."' Counsel had not
produced the declarant (although he had subpoenaed her), nor did he
demonstrate more clearly her intended invocation of the privilege. 386 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion,'" saying that the proponent
had "utterly failed to carry the burden" of establishing unavailability.'" The
court called proponent's showing "extenuated and circuitous," and ruled that
the trial court had correctly excluded the evidence, since there was merely a
"speculative basis for determining" unavailability.'" The Pelton court relied
upon United States v. Amaya, 3 " in which the Fifth Circuit had upheld the admis-
sion of former testimony on the basis that the declarant had been sufficiently
shown to be suffering from a memory loss so that his live testimony was
unavailable."' The defendant, opposing the evidence, had unsuccessfully
sought a continuance in order to allow expert testimony on the permanence of
the memory loss."' It is not clear whether the opponent was prepared to pre-
sent that expert testimony, or was asking the court to require a greater showing
from the proponent. In any event, the trial court refused the continuance, and
was affirmed.'" Each of these cases show that the court customarily allocates
the burden of showing unavailability to the proponent of the evidence.
The policy basis for placing the burden of showing unavailability upon the
proponent of hearsay under Rule 804 is clear. 394
 The congressional judgment,
evidenced in the plain language of the Rule and in its legislative history,'" is
clear, and the policy result for burden allocation logically follows. Never-
theless, fairness and efficiency concerns will vary on the facts of each case, so
the policy implication, however clear, should not mandate a uniform result.
385
 Id. at 709 (quoting from the record of proceedings below).
3" Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
3" Id. at 709-10.
'90 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976).
391 Id. at 191.
392 Id. (Whether memory loss was actually permanent was not determinative, since the
question was whether the loss would be of such duration that postponement would not be prac-
tical.). But see People v. Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 54, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 421 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (In the absence of medical testimony whether physical or mental health of rape victim
is temporary or permanent, the witness is presumed available.).
393 533 F.2d at 192.
394 See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 486, at 1024-25. While there is
controversy as to whether some exceptions should require unavailability, there is no controversy
that those exceptions in Rule 804(b) require the declarant to be unavailable and those in Rule
801(d) and 803 do not. See id.
395 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7105 (discussing requirement that "the proponent must also be
unable to procure the declarant's testimony) (emphasis added); HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. Doc. No. 650,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7088 ("The
amendment is designed primarily to require that an attempt be made to depose a witness [as well
as to seek his attendance] as a precondition to the witness being deemed unavailable.")
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Given the trial court's broad discretion over all questions of admissibility, it
should be possible to find leeway in a compelling case, to ask the opponent to
make some showing of the availability of live testimony. In Felton, for instance,
the proponent had caused a subpoena to be issued for the witness, and had
represented to the court a basis for his conclusion that the witness would be
unavailable because of an assertion of privilege. 396
 The exclusion of the out-of-
court testimony in this instance is defensible since claims of privilege can be
overruled, and since the trial judge perhaps should rule on the claim of
privilege only after seeing the witness. On the other hand, in situations in
which a privilege clearly applies, going through the procedure is a futile
gesture. Exclusion on the grounds set forth in Pelton would not be justified,
unless the opponent of the hearsay proffer can show that the apparently ap-
plicable privilege does not exist. In such cases, the principle of efficiency calls
for reliance on the representations of counse1. 397 Similarly, in Anzaya, memory
loss had been established, and the only question was how long it would last. 398
The proponent had already established a lack of memory, and therefore the
precondition of unavailability was shown to exist. Thus, the court correctly
held that the preference for live testimony is not strong enough to justify a con-
tinuance for the opponent to secure expert testimony on the issue of whether
another continuance would alleviate the problem of unavailability." 9 Purely
on efficiency grounds, Amaya reached a justifiable result.
(B) Statements Against Interest: Rule 804(b)(3)
Three of the hearsay exceptions conditioned upon a showing of unavaila-
bility are essentially restatements of the more liberal common law trends. 40°
396 See supra text and notes at notes 385-89.
397 Cf. Castilleja v. Southern Pac. Co., 445 F.2d 183, 186 ("It was within the discretion
of the trial court to accept or reject counsel's representations[,] regarding unavailability"). See
also Bailey v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
836 (1980).
3" United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1978).
399 Id.
400 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony); 804(b)(2) (dying declaration); 804(b)(4)
(statement of personal or family history).
The exception for former testimony is subject to a number of prerequisites, the most
problematical being that the opponent, "the party against whom the testimony is now offered,"
must have had "an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony" at the prior hear-
ing. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). It seems anomalous to require the proponent of evidence to
establish his opponent's motive and opportunity at an earlier proceeding. The courts, however,
have not experienced any problems with respect to the burden on admissibility in implementing
this section of the rule. Such difficulty does not arise because the cases consider prior proceedings
categorically, and easily infer opportunity and similar motive, even in proceedings for purposes
unrelated to the purposes of the present trial. See generally 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 9, 487, at 1085-1111; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4 1 , 1804(b) (1) [02]-1051,
at 805-57-75. The opportunity to develop testimony is easily found, if the opponent, "the party
against whom the testimony is now offered," has ever confronted the witness before on the same
issues. The opportunity also will be found even if the previous testimony was not subject to cross-
978	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:927
The exception for statements against interest,"' however, caused more con-
troversy. The policy favoring the admissibility of statements against interest is
based upon the assumption that a reasonable person would not make such a
statement unless he believed it to be true. 402
 Since that guarantee of reliability
is the underlying rationale, to implement that policy, the proponent of a state-
ment who relies upon this exception should show that the statement was self-
damaging when made, in order to demonstrate the reliability which is the basis
for its admissibility. In addition to establishing unavailability, under the
language of the rule the proponent must show that the statement was either
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or subjected him
to civil or criminal liability."' As the Advisory Committee observed, that the
examination; a chance to examine directly is enough. See id., 1 804(b) (1) [03]. The burden on the
proponent to show opportunity is not particularly onerous.
It is "similar motive" which is more troubling, particularly in criminal cases when the
former testimony is from a preliminary hearing. See 4 D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9,
5 487, at 1091-94. The sole stated purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine probable
cause to justify further proceedings. See FED. R. GRIM. P. 5.1. In addition to attempting to defeat
the showing of probable cause, in a preliminary hearing, defense counsel often tries incidentally
to discover the prosecution case. Perhaps he will also attempt to fix testimony for possible later
use in impeachment. These varying motives, however, are rarely considered dispositive. The
burden is formally upon the proponent to establish the elements of the exception. In reality, this
burden has not proven to be heavy.
The specific exception for dying declarations, codified in Rule 804, has perhaps the
longest and most tortuous history. See C. MCCoRmtDK, supra note 4, 55 281-287, at 680-85; 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, 55 1430-52, at 275-321 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). At common law, use of
the exception was restricted to homicide cases. The statement had to be made while the victim
believed that death was imminent, and it had to concern the cause of death. Death was the only
type of unavailability which would justify admission. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 55
281-83. The Federal Rule expands the applicability of the exception. If the declarant is
unavailable for any of the reasons listed in Rule 804(a), that will suffice; he need not be dead.
The statement still must be made by the declarant "while believing that death is imminent,"
and its subject must concern the cause or circumstances of his apparently impending death. The
subject of the statement will normally be evident from its content, so in addition to unavailability,
the proponent generally need establish only the declarant's belief in his impending death.
The policy for placing this responsibility upon the proponent is directly related to the
reliability justification for admitting the evidence. The non-secular justification emphasizes the
solemnity of the deathbed scene which enhances reliability. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, 5 1438,
at 289 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). Later theorists focus more on psychological factors such as the
uncertainty, and the absence of motive to falsify. Id. 5 1443, at 302-03 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
See also Wilson v. State, 86 Nev. 320, 325, 468 P.2d 346, 350 (1970) (proponent not required to
establish deceased declarant's belief in God). Despite criticism that a statement in such cir-
cumstances may not be reliable, see generally Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism of
Present Law and the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1970), the historical roots of
the exception are deep, and the necessity for the evidence is clear. Thus, the hearsay rule will not
exclude it if the proponent satisfies the requirements of the exception. Other objections can be
made to the evidence, however, under Rules 602, 701, and of course 403. See FED. R. Evict.
804(b) (2) advisory committee note (objections to declarations phrased in terms of opinion may
be raised under FED. R. Evin. 701 and objections to a lack of firsthand knowledge may be raised
under FED. R. EvID. 602).
4" FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (3).
402 See id. advisory committee note.
4" See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) and advisory committee note.
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statement be against interest is "a condition precedent to admissibility. " 404
The burden is not onerous, and always can be satisfied by an examination of
the statement and the circumstances of its making. The test of interest is an ob-
jective one: "that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to the true. 5405
The drafters of the Rule expanded the common law exception by adding
criminal liability as an interest which guaranteed the reliability of statements." 6
In order to allay fears about the expansion of the common law exception,
however, the Advisory Committee added a limitation: "A statement tending to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborated. " 407 The Advisory
Committee observed that "the provision is cast in terms of a requirement
preliminary to admissibility. The requirement of corroboration should be con-
strued in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrica-
tion." 4" Congress, sharing this concern, made the requirement of corrobora-
tion even more stringent. 409 As enacted, the Rule provides that a statement
against penal interest which tends to exculpate the accused "is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement. " 410 The concern for the reliability of such statements, which was
more intense in Congress than in the Advisory Committee, clearly indicates
that the proponent must show trustworthiness. Professor Kaplan, to the con-
trary, raised the possibility that "it is the opponent rather than the proponent
who has the burden of persuasion," but he conceded that "the issue is far from
clear." 4 " With respect to the exception for statements against penal interest, in
light of the rule's unequivocal legislative history, the resolution of the issue is
clear, and the burden is upon the proponent.
The requirement that the trustworthiness of a statement tending to ex-
culpate the accused be "clearly indicate[d]" by corroborating circumstances
may be interpreted as affecting the standard of persuasion which is imposed. 412
If the congressional addition of "clearly" to the trustworthiness requirement
affects the standard of persuasion, however, there may be constitutional prob-
464 FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committe note.
405 FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3).
4" 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1972).
4°7 Id.
4" Id. at 327.
4" H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 15-16, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7089-90.
410
 FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3). The drafters of the Rules objected specifically to the addi-
tion of the word "clearly," stating that it "imposes a burden beyond those ordinarily attending
the admissibility of evidence, particularly that offered by accused persons." See 4J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 41, at 804-13.
4" Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs—An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CALIF, L. REV.
987, 994 n.9 (1978).
412 See supra note 410. See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 297-98 (1973)
(defendant proffered statement by third party; state evidence law did not include penal interest as
basis for admissibility; exclusion held to violate due process).
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lems as well as confused policy. The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the
due process clause may require that exculpatory evidence be admitted." An
alternative interpretation is possible. The terms of Rule 804(b)(3) require the
proponent of a statement against penal interest which exculpates the defendant
to convince the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. So inter-
preted, the Rule does not impose a more rigorous standard of persuasion, it
merely states the proposition of which the decisionmaker must be convinced.
This analysis saves the Rule from being unrealistically stringent and thereby
subject to constitutional attack. It also preserves the exception from becoming a
nullity, largely unusable by criminal defendants.
Judge Weinstein notes that the requirement of corroboration "has been
interpreted so stringently that it is difficult to conceive of the Rule having much
utility. " 414 In his analysis of Rule 804(b)(3), Judge Weinstein criticizes United
States v. Bagley, 415 in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of a statement proffered under Rule 804(b)(3). 416 Bagley, a federal prisoner,
was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute it. 4" He offered
the statement of another prisoner, Schropshire, who had since died, to his
cellmate Duke, to the effect that he had given Bagley the heroin by mistake,
having intended to give him Valium." The trial court held that, since the
statement was to Schropshire's cellmate, it was not against penal interest, but
the Fifth Circuit disagreed." The court of appeals, however, held that the trial
judge's finding that the corroboration requirement had not been met was not
clearly erroneous, and affirmed."°
After a discussion of the scope of appellate review, 42 ' the Court divided the
trustworthiness requirement into two components. First, "the statement must
afford a basis for believing the truth of the matter asserted," and the court
found that element to have been satisfied. 422 Second, trustworthiness is con-
cerned with "whether a statement offered to exculpate an accused was actually
made. " 429 On this issue, the court held that the trial judge's ruling must be
sustained because Duke, the proffered witness, was the only person who heard
415 Raising the standard of persuasion necessarily makes it more difficult to get the
evidence admitted. As the Chambers decision indicated, exclusionary rules of evidence which pre-
vent the presentation of a defense may run afoul of the values expressed in the Compulsory Proc-
ess clause of the sixth amendment. See supra note 412.
"4 41 WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1 804(b) (3) [03), at 804-108.
45 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977). The criticism is
reciprocated. See id., at 168.
4" Id. at 164.
4 " Id.; see 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)(1976).
"8 537 F.2d at 164.
"9 Id. at 165.
420 Id.
421 Id. at 165-67 (holding that clearly erroneous standard applies; trial court decision
without findings should be upheld if any reasonable view of the evidence supports its ruling).
422 Id. If the statement was actually made, there is no reason to doubt its veracity. Id.
4" Id.
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it, and could no longer hurt his now-dead cellmate, Schropshire, by fabricating
a statement to exculpate his still-living friend, Bagley. 424 In addition, neither
Duke, nor the six other witnesses proffered by Bagley had mentioned Valium
until shortly before Bagley's trial, and all the witnesses, as prisoners, had been
convicted of crimes, and were therefore less worthy of belief*" The court ex-
plicitly relied upon the congressional changes in Rule 804(b)(3), particularly
the addition of the word "clearly. " 426 The court had no doubt that the respon-
sibility for establishing the two elements of trustworthiness was upon the pro-
ponent of the statement. 427
Bagley can be read narrowly, as classic appellate obeisance to trial court
discretion,429 or it can be interpreted as imposing a strict standard for the ad-
mission of statements exculpating the accused. 429 Later cases have deferred to
the trial court's discretion, while noting that the corroboration requirement is a
substantial one. 4" The standard, however, should not be "so strict as to be ut-
terly unrealistic. " 433 Furthermore, courts should consider the impact of con-
stitutional restrictions on limiting the accused's presentation of evidence. 432 In
United States v. Thomas, 439 the trial court had concluded that a proffered state-
ment was not against the declarant's penal interest. 434 The court of appeals
reversed this finding, 435 and, therefore, examined the trustworthiness issue.
Since the trial court had not addressed the trustworthiness question, the court
of appeals was able to evade Bagley's restriction on the scope of appellate
424 Id.
425 Id. at 167-68.
423 Id. As Judge Weinstein notes, several of the factors identified by the Bagley court on
the question of whether the statement was actually made relate to the credibility of the witness, an
issue particularly suited to jury determination. See 41 WEINSTEIN Sr. M. BERGER, supra note 41,
804(b) (3) [03], at 804-108-09; 537 F.2d at 167-68. See also CAL. EVID. CODE 403(a) (4) (West
1966) (assigns a preliminary issue to the jury, if the "preliminary fact is whether that person
made the statement").
In Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1979), The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit rejected the view that the reliability of the witness' testimony, that the state-
ment was made, constituted part of the trustworthiness requirement.. Id. at 293. See infra text and
notes at notes 453-66.
In United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit relied upon
the Bagley reasoning to impose identical requirements of corroboration upon statements offered
by the prosecution to inculpate the accused. Id. at 701. While Rule 804(b) (3) does not so limit in-
culpatory statements, the court did so on the basis of the constitutional right of confrontation. Id.
at 700-01. See also United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir. 1981).
42" 537 F.2d at 167-68.
423 Id. at 167. See also United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976) (rule
confides to the trial court "a substantial degree of discretion").
422 Cf. United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976).
433 Id.
431 Id.
432 Id.
433 571 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1978).
434 Id. at 288. A co-defendant's statement exculpating the defendant which was made at
the close of the preliminary hearing and overheard by the United States magistrate, attorneys
and a reporter was held inadmissible.
4" Id.
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review. 436 There was little doubt that the statement had been made; the witness
proffered to testify to it was a federal magistrate. 4" After reviewing the cir-
cumstances in the record, the Fifth Circuit concluded that trustworthiness was
clearly indicated . 438
It would be unfortunate if the courts of appeals were to follow Bagley's
restriction on the scope of appellate review. 439 Such a course would deprive
trial courts of the benefit of guidance to distinguish circumstances which cor-
roborate from those which do not. If that approach takes hold, then appellate
consideration of the trustworthiness requirement will be, as in Thomas, hap-
pen stantial. 44 °
As for the allocation of the burden, the policy bases for assigning it to the
proponent conflict. If all relevant evidence should be admissible unless clearly
excluded, then the burden should be upon the opponent. Hearsay, however,
should be excluded unless the proponent carries the burden of showing the ap-
plicability of an exception. Even when the proponent has satisfied the basic re-
quirements for admission of a statement against interest, however, Congress
has removed the presumption of trustworthiness for the class of statements
tending to exculpate the accused. Thus, the policy articulated by Congress
erects an additional hurdle which must be overcome by the proponent of such
statements. Once again, questions of fairness and efficiency will vary widely
with the circumstances of each case. The policy choice explicit in the Rule can-
not be ignored, but perhaps it can be accommodated even when concerns of
fairness and efficiency point to a different allocation of the burden. It is clear
that due process requires that the prosecution reveal exculpatory evidence
upon defense request."' This requirement should be interpreted so as to im-
pose upon the prosecution the duty to reveal evidence of corroborating cir-
cumstances, which would support a finding of trustworthiness. If evidence of
corroboration were revealed to the defendant-proponent, fairness and efficien-
cy would be served, and the proponent will be able to satisfy more easily the
burden assigned in compliance with the congressional policy choice.
Thus, the proponent of a declaration against interest bears the burden of
persuasion on several preliminary facts: unavailability, the against interest re-
quirement, and in the case of statements tending to exculpate the criminal
defendant, the corroboration of trustworthiness. Only by applying the due
process requirement upon the prosecution to reveal exculpatory evidence, can
fairness concerns be made consistent with the policy.
436 Id. at 290.
437 Id. at 288.
4" Id.
439 See supra note 421.
440 The only reason that the appellate court in Thomas was able to reach the issue of cor-
roborating circumstances was that trial court, having held that the proffered statement was not
against penal interest, did not need to address the corroboration requirement. Id. at 290. See supra
text and note at note 438.
44 ' Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 103-07 (1976).
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(iv) "Great Hearsay:" Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)
As they emerged from Congress, Rules 803, dealing with hearsay general-
ly, and 804, dealing with hearsay when the declarant is unavailable, each con-
tained a residual exception for "great hearsay," 442 that is, evidence which did
not meet the requirements of any of the enumerated exceptions, but which was
reliable enough to justify admission. 443 As submitted by the Supreme Court,
the exceptions were to apply to "a statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. "444 The House rejected the provisions "as injecting too much
uncertainty into the law of evidence." 445 The Senate reinstated them, but
changed "comparable" to "equivalent" in modifying "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" and added several additional requirements for
admissibility. 4 46
To be admitted, therefore, a statement must (1) have circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those in the enumerated excep-
tions; 447 (2) be evidence of a material fact; 448 and (3) be more probative than
any other evidence which the proponent can reasonably procure. 449 Further-
more, admission must serve "the general purposes of these rules and the in-
terests of justice. " 450 Also, the proponent must provide sufficient advance
notice to enable the opponent to prepare, either to contest admissibility, or to
meet the evidence. 451
442 See Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New Day for "Great"
Hearsay?, 2 LITIGATION 22, 24 (1975). See also D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN, & J. WALTZ, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 260 (4th ed. 1981).
"' FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b) (5).
444 56 F.R.D. 183, 303 & 322 (1972).
445 H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079.
446 S. REP. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 18-20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, 7051, 7065-66. The Senate provision prevailed, but the Conference Committee
added a notice requirement. H.R. REP. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7105.
447 FED. R. Evin. 803(24) & 804(b) (5).
448 FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(6) (5). The better reading of the materiality require-
ment simply subjects the proffer to the relevance requirements of FED. R. EVID. 401. See Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 294 & n.13 (7th Cir. 1979) (applies Rule 401 in a Rule
803(24) context). Hence the requirement is surplusage. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 9, S 472, at 934; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 803(24) [01], at 803-293.
449 FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b) (5).
4" FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b) (5). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 102. Although inspiring, the
requirement is not significant. See 4 D. LOUISELL &O. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 472, at 939-41 &
n.94 (this requirement has not proved significant in decisions regarding FED. R. EVID. 803(24));
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1804(24) [01], at 803-294; 11 J. MOORE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, S 803(24) [7], at VII-210.
4" FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b) (5). How strictly this procedural requirement should
be enforced is a question which has received varying responses. Compare United States v. Ruffin,
575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978) (FED. R. EVID. 802(24) can only be used when notice has been
given) with United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) if the proponent of the
evidence is without fault in failing to provide notice and the trial judge has granted a continuance
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A cogent analysis of the residual exceptions 452 is contained in the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Huff L. White Motor Corp.*" In this wrongful death action,
the defendant offered a statement by the deceased about the cause of the acci-
dent which resulted in his death."' The trial court was affirmed in its rejection
of the assertion that the evidence was an admission,'" and the appellate court
refused to consider White Motor's contention that the evidence was a state-
ment against interest, since the contention had not been raised at tria1. 456
Although acknowledging the trial court's considerable discretion on the issue of
the residual exception, the court of appeals did review the record with a view
toward exercising its own independent discretion, since no explicit ruling had
been made on the availability of residual exception, and since no findings had
been recorded."' The court examined all five of the requirements for ad-
missibility, but focused on the two substantive ones: the trustworthiness of the
evidence, and its probative value relative to other 'accessible evidence."'" The
court found that the statement by plaintiff's decedent had "equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," because the statement was not
ambiguous, it was made within a few days of the accident, and it was contrary
to the declarant's pecuniary interest.'" There was some question, however,
about the declarant's mental competence at the time of making the statement,
so the court remanded for a determination by the trial judge of the competence
of the declarant, noting that "[t]he burden is on the proponent of the evidence
to prove capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. 77460
The allocation of this burden to the proponent is curious but correct.
Mental capacity of a witness testifying before the jury is not a prerequisite for
admitting the testimony, so usually, any proof on the issue of capacity is sub-
mitted, if at all, by the opponent of a witness. Under the Federal Rules,
to allow the opponent of the evidence time to prepare to contest its admission, the notice require-
ment of FED. R. EvID. 803(24) has been met).
4" Courts have frequently analyzed the identical provisions simultaneously. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also 4 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 9, 472, at 922.
455 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979).
434 Id. at 290.
453 Id. The statement was proffered as an admission on the basis that the declarant was
in privity with the plaintiff. Id. See C. MCCORmicK, supra note 4, 5 268, at 647. The court re-
jected that argument, since Rule 801(d) (2) does not exclude privity-based admissions from the
hearsay ban. Id. at 291. Therefore, such statements must meet one of the hearsay exceptions to
be admitted. Id.
4" Id. at 290 & n.2. In addition, no mention was made of the dying declaration excep-
tion under FED. R. EVER 804(b) (2). Id.
4" Id. at 291. Cf. supra text and notes at notes 428-40.
458 609 F.2d at 292-95. The court acknowledged the notice, materiality, and interests of
justice provisions, and held that they had been satisfied. Id. at 294-95.
4" Id. at 292-94. The court did not include either the reliability of the witness' testimony
or corroboration of the truth of the statement as factors relevant to admissibility. Id.
488 it at 294. The court acknowledged that competence of a witness was clearly a ques-
tion of credibility for the jury under FED. R. EvID. 601 and Indiana law, but held that the deter-
mination of trustworthiness was one for the judge under FED. R. EVID, 104(a). Id. at 293-94 &
n.12.
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moreover, the only limitations on an incompetent witness testifying would be
that of Rule 403, with the burden upon the opponent, or perhaps in an extreme
case, that of Rule 401, with a relatively light burden upon the proponent."' In
Huff however, the declarant was not present before the jury, nor did the state-
ment comply with the requirements of any specific hearsay exception. 462 So the
proponent must show trustworthiness, and therefore must show mental capaci-
ty."' The court of appeals noted the possible inadequacy of the record, and in-
vited the trial court to permit the parties to present evidence on the question of
mental capacity. 464 The court only briefly analyzed the requirement that the
statement must be "more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts. "463 In this case, the requirement was easily met; the declarant was
alone at the time of the accident, so his statement was the most salient evidence
of the circumstances. 468
Other cases have presented more difficulty for the proponent. In United
States v. Kime, 487 the defendant offered a telex from a Korean bank as evidence
that he did not have serious financial problems, to rebut the prosecution's
evidence that he did have such problems. 468 The District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the exclusion of the telex message, holding that, not only did the prof-
fer fail to meet the trustworthiness requirement, but also it did not meet the
relative probativeness requirement. 468 The evidence, the court implied, would
be relevant under Rule 401, but it was not as probative as "actual business
records," or the testimony of associates on the sources of defendant's
income. 470 Since the proffered evidence was not more probative than other
reasonably attainable evidence it was excluded.in
The policy underlying the residual exception is clear: "Congress intended
the exception to apply in a very few cases in which the evidence is very impor-
tant and very reliable. "472 The congressional hostility to the catchall provi-
sions, and their hedging with preliminary requirements support this policy
conclusion. 473 With respect to evidence proffered under these subdivisions, the
4" See infra text and notes at notes 487-91.
462 609 F.2d at 290. The statement may have met the requirements of FED. R. EV1D.
804(b) (3), but that provision was not invoked at trial. If it had been, then the burden would have
been upon the opponent to show lack of mental capacity, in order to have the judge exclude the
evidence pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 403. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 489,
at 1133 & n.67. See also supra text and notes at notes 124-31.
463 609 F.2d at 294. "If that mental capacity was lacking, so are the guarantees of
trustworthiness." Id.
464 Id. at 294.
465 Id. at 294-95. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24) & 804(b) (5).
466 609 F.2d at 295.
467 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
4" Id. at 759.
469 Id. at 765-66.
37° Id. at 766.
471 Id.
472
479 See supra text and notes at notes 445-46.
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hostile policy should predominate over the factors of fairness and efficiency in
all but the most extreme cases. The proponent can justly be required to show
guarantees of reliability similar to guarantees which support the admission of
evidence under specific exceptions. The requirement of heightened probative
value ensures that the evidence is necessary. The evidence must be more than
merely relevant; it must be more persuasive than any other reasonably ob-
tainable evidence. Considering the lack of conventional guarantees of reliabili-
ty, the requirements are not too onerous.
B. Qualification of Witnesses
1. Capacity
At common law, there were a variety of categories of people who would
not be permitted to testify, based upon mental disability, infancy, conviction of
a crime, religious belief, or interest in the outcome of the case. 474
 These
categorical exclusions of witnesses gradually have been rejected over the past
150 years, 4" as courts came to regard them as irrational. Before their complete
rejection, in order to restrict the exclusion of witnesses, the courts placed the
burden of establishing incompetency upon the party objecting to the witness. 476
The policy of full exposition of facts by witnesses supplanted the policies
underlying ancient rules of incompetency, and the more modern policy was
served by manipulation of the burdens on the preliminary question. 477 The
allocation to the objecting party was followed in the United States, 478 without
+ 74 See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 251 (competency restrictions in-
clude: mental disability; immaturity; prior conviction [infamy]; interest; marital relation;
religious belief).
475 See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 470 (1918) ("in light of general authority
and sound reason," Court rejects common law disqualification for prior conviction); C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 4, S 61, at 139 (common law rules of incompetency have undergone such
change that most of the former ground rules for excluding witnesses have been converted to
grounds for impeachment); 2 & 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, SS 483-721 (Chadbourn rev. 1979,
1970).
476 See People v. Farley, 90 Cal. App. 3d 851, 868-69, 153 Cal. Rptr. 695, 705 (Cal.
App. 1979) (burden is on opponent of the witness when attempting to disqualify for incapacity);
People v. Craig, 111 Cal. 460, 469, 44 P. 186, 188 (1896) (burden is on the opponent of the
witness when attempting to disqualify for incompetency); Clealand v. Huey, 18 Ala. 343, 346
(1850) (burden is on the opponent of the witness when attempting to disqualify for interest); Rex
v. Bray, 95 Eng. Rep. 232, 233-34 (K.B. 1736) (burden is on the opponent when attempting to
disqualify for interest). See also 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, 5 484, at 642 (Chadboum rev. 1979)
(stating generally when burden is on opponent when attempting to disqualify); S 497, at 703
(burden is on opponent when attempting to disqualify for incapacity); 5 584 (burden is on oppo-
nent when attempting to disqualify for interest).
477
 In the early eighteenth century, the Court of the King's Bench indicated that the
burden of demonstrating disqualification of a witness on the basis of an interest in the outcome of
the case was on the party objecting to his testimony. Rex v. Bray, 95 Eng. Rep. 232, 233-34
(K.B. 1736). When the judge was persuaded that the witness was incompetent, the rule of exclu-
sion was observed. The rule, however, was subverted by the allocation of the burden of persua-
sion on the question of competency.
4" See, e.g., Hulahart v. Han, 1 N.J.L. 62, 62 (1790) (defendant cannot lose the benefit
of a witness on a bare allegation of interest). See also W. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE. SS 142-43, at 131 (Phipson ed. 1922).
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any explicit discussion of the reason for it, except to say that competency was
presumed until the contrary was proven. 479 The rejection of evidence on any of
the bases of incompetency is now nearly universally regarded as irrational, 48°
but evidence which formerly rendered a witness incompetent can still generally
be used to impeach credibility."' The treatment of competency disputes pro-
vides a valuable insight into allocating the burden in order to foster, or to
obstruct, the application of a legal principle.
Federal Rule 601 eliminates the incongruity by eliminating categorical in-
competencies. 482 Witnesses who are under the influence of drugs, 485 or who
may be mentally disturbed484 are not incompetent under the Rule. In extreme
cases, however, the court can exclude testimony from such witnesses as failing
to meet the minimum standard of relevance under Rule 401, 485 or by ruling
that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the considerations
enumerated in Rule 403. 488 If minimal relevance is the issue, then, consistent
with Rule 401, the burden of establishing probative value will rest upon the
proponent to show that the testimony of this witness will make a fact of conse-
quence to the action more probable than it would be without the testimony. 487
On the other hand, if relevance is established, then the opponent of the witness
will bear the burden of showing that the evidence should be excluded under
Rule 403. 488 When there is an objection that the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion, or by the
other factors enumerated in Rule 403, then under that Rule, it is the opponent
of the witness who must justify the trial court's use of its power to exclude. 489
Despite the absolute language of Rule 601, trial judges continue to use the
concept of incompetency to exclude witnesses altogether. In United States v.
McRary, 49° for example, the trial court ruled that a defense witness who had
been found incompetent to stand trial was therefore incompetent to testify for
479 See Densler v. Edwards, 5 Ala. 31, 34, (1843).
499 See Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 105-08 (1963). See also 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1 601[03], at 601-17 (modern trend in all jurisdictions has
been to abrogate ancient rules of disqualification).
49i See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, $ 61, at 139. But see FED. R. EvID. 610 (prohib-
iting use of religious belief to impeach a witness).
492 FED. R. EvID. 601. "Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules." Id. There are specific rules concerning the trial judge and jurors as
witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 605-606.
4" See United States v. Callahan, 442 F. Supp. 1213, 1221 (D. Minn. 1978) (witness
who took narcotics on day he testified not automatically incompetent to testify).
494 See United States v. McRary, 616 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1980) (wife who suffered
from a mental illness not automatically incompetent to testify).
4" See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 252, at 17-19 (where a witness
labors under a great incapacity, testimony may so lack probative value that it is irrelevant); 3 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1 601[04], at 601-28 (since the testimony of in-
competents may lack probative value, the judge under rule 401 may exclude such evidence).
499 See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 1 601[04], at 601-29.
4" See FED. R. EVID. 401; supra text and notes at notes 103-17.
499 See FED. R. Evil:). 403.
+0 See supra text and notes at notes 118-31.
49° 616 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1980).
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her husband, the defendant*" The Fifth Circuit reversed, saying that "the
defense [proponent] should have been afforded an opportunity to make a prof-
fer and a record to determine the witness' ability to testify." 492 The court stated
in a footnote its doubts as to whether mental incapacity was an exception to the
general rule that a witness cannot be disqualified for incornpetency, 493 so its
holding that there was error in failing to permit a proffer was based upon a
relevancy analysis. If mental illness constituted incompetency to testify, then
under traditional authority the burden on the issue would be allocated to the
objector. 494 Since the decision was reversed because the proponent was unable
to make a proffer, the Fifth Circuit thought it was incumbent upon the propo-
nent to establish admissibility. However light the burden under relevancy
analysis,495 it is still imposed upon the proponent. 496 Thus, to analyze the prob-
lem as one of relevancy leads to moving the burden from the opponent, who
bore it under traditional incompetency rules, to the proponent. This makes the
allocation even more inconsistent with Rule 601's preclusion of incompetency
as a bar to testimony.
The policy of liberal admissibility of relevant evidence, which had led to
placing the burden upon the party alleging incompetency, is directly im-
plemented by Rule 601's general declaration of competency. 497 Consistent with
that policy, under Rule 601, objections to the ability of a witness to testify on
the basis of incompetency are meritless. Where the claimed incompetency is so
severe that it leads the court to doubt the relevance of the testimony, it will be
the proponent's burden to show relevance. 498 In less severe cases, in which the
testimony is relevant, but there may be countervailing dangers, it will be the
opponent's burden to show that the risks of the evidence substantially outweigh
its probative value. 499 So, Rule 601 has transformed the policy question into
one of relevance and its counterweights, instead of one relating to artificial
categorization of witnesses prohibited from testifying.
It is fairer to assign the burden of proving relevance to the proponent,
since he will usually have more information about the witness he proffers than
the objector. For this same reason, it will generally be more efficient for the
proponent to marshal the facts on the mental state of the proffered witness in
response to a relevance objection.
491 Id. at 183. The trial judge indicated that the proffered witness, having been found in-
competent to stand trial in the instant case, would be incompetent to stand trial for perjury, and
therefore should not be permitted to testify. Id.
492 Id.
493 Id, at 183 n.1. (citing United States v. Roach, 580 F.2d 181, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1979)
(footnotes omitted)).
494 See supra text and notes at notes 476-79.
496 See supra text and notes at notes 484-86. The McRary court noted that, since the de-
fendant himself was relying upon a defense of insanity, the admission of evidence on that issue
should be liberal. 616 F.2d at 184.
496 See supra text and notes at notes 476-79.
497 FED. R. EVIL). 601.
498 See supra text and notes at notes 115-17
499 See supra text and note at note 131.
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Of the three basic criteria for assigning burdens, it is the policy of easy ad-
missibility of relevant evidence which is the most significant. Even though the
burden of establishing relevance is upon the proponent, the standard of Rule
401 is an easy one to meet. When the relevance of the evidence as presented by
the witness is established, then questions which were formerly ones of com-
petency are now resolved under the rubric of Rule 403, with the burden to
show inadmissibility placed upon the opponent. Since the law governing in-
competency now is consistent with the general policy of admissibility of rele-
vant evidence, the allocation of the burdens on these preliminary questions im-
plements, rather than impedes the operation of the law.
2. Expert Testimony
The "[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to
be a witness" mentioned in Rule 104(a), upon which the court is to make a
determination, are those which arise under Rule 702, governing expert testi-
mony.'" Although Rule 702 does not explicitly allocate the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion, there is little doubt 50 ' that the party who proffers expert
testimony must assume the responsibility of demonstrating that the evidence 502
will assist the trier of fact, and that the witness is qualified as an expert. 503
"° FED. R. EvID. 702. Although FED. R. EvID. 104(a) is broadly phrased, in federal
practice, all of the common law categories of incompetency have been abandoned, unless State
law governs the rule of decision. FED. R. EvID. 601 advisory committee note. See supra text and
notes at notes 483-97.
5" See Pierkowskie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 F.2d 928, 934 (3d Cir. 1945) (that an
expert must be fully qualified before being subject to cross-examination on qualifications is
"almost rudimentary"); 2 J. WIGMORE supra note 1, § 560, at 756 (Chadbourn rev. 1979)
(qualification of witness must be shown by the offering party).
5" While experts normally testify in the form of opinion, they may also offer other
evidence. FED. R. EvID. 702 ("expert ... may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise"); see id., advisory committee note.
A problem closely related to the presentation of expert evidence is that raised by the offer
of evidence based upon new scientific processes. When novel scientific techniques are offered as
the basis for expert evidence, the prevailing rule is that the proponent of the evidence must
demonstrate general acceptance of the technique by the scientific community. See Frye v. United
States, 293 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Although the Frye standard has been subject to
severe criticism, there remains considerable support for the standard. See Giannelli, The Admissi-
bility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUNI. L. REV. 1197,
1228 (1980). See also 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, 382, at 644 (Frye standard has
survived enactment of Rule 702. Evidence not accepted in scientific community, however, might
still be helpful to a jury and qualify under Rule 702). But see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 41, 1 702[03], at 702-16 (no mention of the Frye standard by the drafters in Rule 702 should
be considered abandonment of the standard.) The Frye standard is a higher one than relevance
under Rule 401, or helpfulness under Rule 702. Disputes about the desirability of the standard,
however, are directed to the standard of persuasion, not to its allocation.
"3 An expert may be qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education." FED. R. EvID. 702. See Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182, 1188 (8th
Cir. 1981) (expertise in wheelchair accident reconstruction not established by proponent);
United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1978) (expertise of witness
established by proponent); Trick v. Trick, 587 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (party
did not meet its burden of establishing expert's qualification); 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
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Traditionally, the judge determines these questions. 5" "[T]tle trial judge has
broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence,
and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous. " 5°5
Within the discretion granted the trial court, some judges may rely on
assumptions as rules of thumb in qualifying experts. For example, some judges
may consider any licensed physician to be qualified as a medical expert.'" To
respond to this sort of assumption, the objecting party may be forced to assume
the burden of disproving them. Such assumptions are, in effect, presumptions,
since they assist the proponent in satisfying the burdens of persuasion and pro-
duction."' The permissibility of such assumptions depends upon the breadth
of discretion which the court enjoys. This discretion, however, is not unlim-
ited. For example, rules of substantive law, such as those in medical malprac-
tice cases, may require that the witness' expertise relate to a specific geographic
area or to a medical specialty."'" Such rules, of course, serve to limit the court's
reliance on rules of thumb, thus limiting its discretion.
The policy basis for imposing the burden of showing qualification of an
expert upon his proponent is found in the opinion rule, which required
witnesses to testify to "facts," and not to "opinions."'" Expert evidence is fre-
quently"° in the form of opinion, thus the proponent of expert evidence should
carry the onus of demonstrating that the proffer is an exception to the rule
generally prohibiting opinion testimony. The analogous principle in traditional
supra note 9, $ 35, at 258-59 (proponent bears burden of showing its witness' expertise).
504 See infra note 505. Analytically, the only reason to relieve the jury of this task is to
save time. See Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs — An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 987, 999 n.19 (1978). Professor Kaplan's point is apparently that expertise is a matter of
conditional relevance; if the jury does not believe the witness to be an expert, they will not con-
sider his evidence to be relevant. Id.
30 ' Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962), citing Spring Co. v.
Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 645 (1878); United States v. Lopez, 543 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir. 1976); 3
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, T 702[02), at 702-11 (trial judge has great discretion
with regard to admission or exclusion of expert testimony); 2 J.WIGmOlt.E supra note 1, $ 561, at
756-59 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (determination of expert's qualification left to the judge).
In United States v. Winograd, 656 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit refused to
reverse the trial court's decision to permit a witness to testify as an expert, even though the ap-
pellate court agreed that the expert was not adequately qualified. Id. at 282. The court relied on
(1) the trial court's discretion; (2) the limited nature of the testimony; and (3) the appellant's
failure to show that the testimony was incorrect or that it did not assist the jury. Id.
3°° See Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 491, 219 P.2d 79, 85 (1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 892 (1950) (doctors with unlimited licenses are competent to give expert testimony regard-
ing the entire medical field). See also Haynes v. County of Missoula, 163 Mont. 270, 289, 517
P.2d 370, 381 (1973) (fire marshal who has engaged in particular profession, trade or calling for a
reasonable time will be assumed to have ordinary knowledge common to persons in that profes-
sion). These attitudes vary widely, and are simply a matter of the practice of an individual judge.
5" Set Cleary, supra note 23, at 16-21.
na See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, S 381, at 636.
309 See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, 5 11 (discussion of the evolution of the
opinion rule); 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, SS 1917-1922 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
s ' ° FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note.
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burdens analysis is that the party relying upon an exception should
demonstrate its applicability.'" Placing the burdens on the proponent makes it
more difficult, at least theoretically, to present expert evidence. That difficulty
serves the policy ban of the opinion rule.
The exclusion of opinion evidence is not nearly as rigid under the Federal
Rules as it was at its height in common law."' Moreover, the Federal Rules
express a permissive approach toward the admission of relevant:evidence,'"
and a liberal acceptance of expert evidence."" These policies do not alter the
allocation decision, but they should influence the application of Rule 702, with
its two criteria of qualification of the witness, and helpfulness to the trier of
fact. The drafters of the Federal Rules wanted to encourage the use of expert
evidence,'" so if the proponent meets the relatively easy standards of the
Rules, the factfinder will have the benefit of specialized information.
"Fairness," defined as readier access to proof on the disputed proposi-
tion, is also an important factor. It is highly likely that the party proffering ex-
pert testimony will have selected the expert, and prepared the testimony with
the expert's cooperation.'" Accordingly, the party proffering the expert will
easily have any data which would support the finding of qualification. It would
certainly be inequitable to require the expert's opponent to marshal the proof
of lack of expertise or of lack of assistance to the trier of fact. Efficiency is also
an important determinant. The proponent already has the information about
the expert; as a matter of advocacy, the proponent is likely to be prepared to
present the witness to the jury, in order to increase the persuasive effect of his
evidence."' Qualification of the expert is a logical part of that introduction. It
would be illogical for the revelation of the witness' credentials to occur only in
the course of a challenge to expertise. It is more efficient for the factfinder on
qualification, the judge, to hear information in logical progression.'" Also, the
judge can stop the presentation of credentials as soon as he is satisfied that the
proponent has made a satisfactory showing of expertise, and then permit the
opponent to challenge qualification, so that the minimum amount of time is
511
	
G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, S 7.2.1, at 520 (1978); C. M000R-
lv11CK, supra note 4, 5 337, at 787-88; Cleary, supra note 23, at 9-10, quoting Stone, Burden of Proof
and the Judicial Process, 60 L. Q. REV. 262, 280-81 (1944)).
612
 See FED. R. EvtD. 701 advisory committee note.
516
	 I D. LOUISELL & G. MUELLER, supra note 9, 5 111, at 865 (basic tenet that all
relevant evidence is admissible).
See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 41, 702[02], at 702-14 (Federal Rules
emphasize a liberalization of rules on expert testimony).
" 5 See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee note.
516 See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 414 (1952) (expert called by a party
generally expected to represent that party's position). See also T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRIAL TECHNIQUES 5 4.8, at 135-36 (1980).
517 See T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 55 4.8-4.9, at 135-41
(1980).
51B
	
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, S 337, at 787.
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consumed. Of course, the expert's qualifications are also relevant to the weight
and credibility of his testimony, so that information may be repeated for the
jury, 519
 if they have not heard it being presented to the judge. 52°
CONCLUSION
The modern practice of granting the trial judge a good deal of discretion in
matters relating to the admission of evidence is wise. This discretion, however,
must be subject to some structure, and its exercise should be consistent with the
basic principles of the law of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide
the structure. The basic principles developed and illustrated in this article —
policy, fairness and efficiency — are offered to guide the use of trial court
discretion within that structure. They also provide criteria for appellate courts
to evaluate discretionary decisions.
The general policy which underlies the Rules, liberal admissibility of rele-
vant evidence, and specific policies articulated in individual rules, are much
clearer than they are in systems in which the law of evidence is not statutory.
Although it cannot be said that the policy basis for burden-allocation in
preliminary questions is always unambiguous, at least the Rules and their
legislative history provide a point of departure in the search for a statement of
policy.
Fairness concerns, as has been shown, vary with the facts of each case.
The most that can be asked is that fairness be considered when burdens are
allocated. Obviously, fairness should not dictate an allocation of burdens which
would contravene clear policy. But policy is often not clear. In addition, to
minimize unfairness, a trial judge should encourage cooperation between the
parties, so that information which bears upon the preliminary fact question will
be revealed."'
The influence of efficiency should be analogous. Efficiency concerns will
also vary in each case. When policy does not clearly mandate a burden-
allocation, efficiency should be nearly as important as fairness. Indeed, since
the allocation is set in the context of a preliminary matter, often not related to
the main issues in the case, it can be argued that efficiency is more important
than fairness. Although decisions on preliminary matters often affect the out-
come of the case, 522 they are not the central issues to be resolved. Their resolu-
tion should distract as little attention and as few resources from the central
51° FED. R. EVID. 104(e).
52° FED. R. EVID. 104(c) advisory committee note.
521 In more technical terms, fairness should affect the allocation of the burden of produc-
tion, even when it cannot change the assignment of the burden of persuasion. The burden of pro-
duction is relevant in preliminary fact determinations as an incident of the burden of persuasion.
Set supra text and notes at notes 24-26. Normally, the production burden rests on the party who
has the persuasion burden. See supra note 24. Access to the evidence is a factor, however, which
would justify allocating the two burdens differently. See supra text and notes at notes 239-48, 341
and 441. Cf. supra note 216.
522 See supra text and notes at notes 8-9.
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dispute as possible. Indeed, minimizing the costs of preliminary dispute resolu-
tion is one of the salutory effects of codification, as well as one of its
purposes.i 23 The presentation of evidence remains, however, an adversary
process, and in that process, fairness has always been preferred over efficiency.
When the court allocates the burdens of persuasion and production, it
should consider each of these principles. The very process of considering the
factors of policy, fairness and efficiency is itself an implementation of them.
One of the most basic policies of the Rules of Evidence is that the process of ad-
mission be a rational one. It is an essential aspect of fairness that the parties
know the reasons for decisions which affect them. Finally, efficiency dictates
that the parties know what is expected of them so that they can prepare to meet
those expectations.
